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A Theory of Customary International Law
Jack L. Goldsmitht
Eric A. Posner#t
This Article presents a theory of customary international law ("CIL") that seeks to re-
solve the many well-known difficulties with standard accounts of CIL. The theory uses
simple game theoretical concepts to explain how CIL arises, why nations "comply" with CIL
as commonly understood, and how CIL changes. This theory rejects the usual explanations
of CIL based on opinio juris, legality, morality, and related concepts. States do not comply
with norms of CIL because of a sense of moral or legal obligation; rather, their compliance
and the norms themselves emerge from the states'pursuit of self-interested policies on the
international stage. In addition, the behaviors associated with CIL do not reflect a single,
unitary logic. Instead, they reflect various and importantly different logical structures
played out in discrete, historically contingent contexts. Finally, the theory is skeptical of the
existence of multilateral behavioral regularities that are typically thought to constitute CIL.
The Article tests the theory using case studies from three traditional areas of CIL
neutrality, diplomatic immunity, and maritime jurisdiction. The authors find that most
rules of CIL reflect pure coincidence of interest, rather than international cooperation, and
that the rest are best explained as the outcome of repeated bilateral prisoner's dilemmas or
coercion analogous to the behavior of the monopolist in predatory pricing games. The Arti-
cle concludes by examining the implications of this analysis for understanding the role of
CIL in domestic constitutional arrangements, the function of international treaties and in-
ternational organizations, and the status of modern international human rights law.
Customary international law ("CIL") is one of two primary
forms of international law, the other being the treaty. CIL is typi-
cally defined as a "general and consistent practice of states fol-
lowed by them from a sense of legal obligation."1 Conventional
wisdom views CIL as a unitary phenomenon that pervades inter-
national relations. Governments take care to comply with CIL
and incorporate its norms into domestic statutes. National courts
apply CIL as a rule of decision, or a defense, or a canon of statu-
tory construction. Nations argue about whether certain acts vio-
late CIL. Violations of CIL are grounds for war or international
claims. Legal commentators view CIL to be at the core of the
study of international law.
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
it Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Thanks to Jaqueline Bhabha, John
Bolton, Curtis Bradley, Richard Epstein, David Fidler, Robert Keohane, Tracey Meares,
Jerry Menikoff, Richard Ross, Peter Spiro, Paul Stephan, Cass Sunstein, Doug Sylvester,
Carlos Vasquez, Adrian Vermeule, Tim Wu, and participants at workshops at the George-
town Law Center, Kansas University Law School, Loyola University New Orleans School
of Law, and the University of Chicago Law School for comments, and to Christopher
Chow, Kyle Gehrmann, and Kathryn Walsh for research assistance.
' Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2) (ALI
1987) ('Restatement (Third)").
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And yet CIL remains a puzzle. It lacks a centralized law-
maker, a centralized executive enforcer, and a centralized,
authoritative decisionmaker. The content of CIL seems to track
the interests of powerful nations. The origins of CIL rules are not
understood. We do not know why nations comply with CIL, or
even what it means for a nation to comply with CIL. And we lack
an explanation for the many changes in CIL rules over time.
CIL's standard definition raises perennial, and unanswered,
questions. It is unclear which state acts count as evidence of a
custom, or how broad or consistent state practice must be to sat-
isfy the custom requirement. It is also unclear what it means for
a nation to follow a custom from a sense of legal obligation, or
how one determines whether such an obligation exists.
This Article presents a theory of CIL that seeks to sort out
these and many other difficulties with the standard account of
CIL. The theory uses simple game theoretical concepts to explain
how CIL arises, why nations "comply" with CIL as commonly un-
derstood, and how CIL changes.2
After briefly describing conventional wisdom about CIL in
Section I, we present our theory in Section II. This theory views
the international behaviors traditionally associated with a uni-
tary CIL as variations on one of four different behavioral logics.
The first such logic is coincidence of interest, where behavioral
regularities result from the private advantage that each state ob-
tains from the same action, regardless of the action taken by oth-
ers. The second is coercion, where a powerful state (or coalition of
states with convergent interests) forces or threatens to force other
states to engage in acts that they would not do in the absence of
2 Our approach has many affinities with the rational choice school in international
relations. See James D. Morrow, Modeling the forms of international cooperation" distribu-
tion versus information, 48 Intl Org 387 (1994) (using game theory to identify equilibria
where international actors can benefit by sharing information); Kenneth A. Oye, ed, Coop-
eration Under Anarchy (Princeton 1986); Duncan Snidal, Coordination versus Prisoner's
Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 Am Pol Sci Rev 923
(1985). In recent years, international law scholarship has begun to borrow heavily from
the international relations literature. See Jeffrey L. Dunhoff and Joel P. Trachtman, Eco-
nomic Analysis of International Law: Microanalysis of Macro-Institutions, 24 Yale J Intl L
1 (1999); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello and Stepan Wood, International
Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholar-
ship, 92 Am J Intl L 367 (1998). However, this literature contains no comprehensive
analysis of customary international law through the lens of rational choice, game theory,
and related approaches. Michael Byers' recent book considers CIL from an international
relations perspective, but barely considers game theory. See Michael Byers, Custom,
Power, and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law
(Cambridge 1999). Fernando Tes6n briefly sketches a game-theoretic account of CIL in or-
der to criticize it on positive and especially normative grounds. See Fernando R. Tes6n, A
Philosophy of International Law 74-77 (Westview 1998).
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such force. The third is true cooperation. These cases are best
modeled as a bilateral, iterated prisoner's dilemma in which two
states receive relatively high payoffs over the long term as long
as both states resist the temptation to cheat in the short term.
The fourth situation arises when states face and solve bilateral
coordination problems. In these cases, if states coordinate on
identical or symmetrical actions, they receive higher payoffs than
if they do not coordinate.
Our theory suggests that international behavioral regulari-
ties associated with CIL may reflect coincidence of interest or co-
ercion. These cases have no normative content, for states inde-
pendently pursue their self-interest without generating gains
from interaction. The theory also suggests that some interna-
tional behavioral regularities associated with CIL will reflect co-
operation or coordination, but these regularities will arise in bi-
lateral, not multilateral, interactions.
Our theory differs from the standard conception of CIL in
several fundamental respects. It rejects the usual explanations of
CIL based on legality, morality, and related concepts. States do
not comply with CIL because of a sense of moral or legal obliga-
tion; rather, CIL emerges from the states' pursuit of self-
interested policies on the international stage. In addition, our
theory rejects the traditional claim that the behaviors associated
with CIL reflect a unitary logic. These behaviors instead reflect
different logical structures that describe discrete, historically con-
tingent contexts. Finally, our theory is skeptical of the existence
of multilateral behavioral regularities that are typically thought
to constitute CIL. It holds that multinational regularities will re-
flect coincidence of interest or coercion, and that regularities that
reflect cooperation or coordination arise only in bilateral contexts.
Section III tests the theory using case studies from three tra-
ditional areas of CIL: neutrality, diplomatic immunity, and mari-
time jurisdiction. These rules of CIL are, according to conven-
tional accounts, among the most robust that exist. The case
studies show that international behaviors said to constitute CIL
are not multilateral customary practices, but rather are disparate
and changing practices that follow different logics depending on
the interaction of state interests. The case studies also suggest
that the behaviors associated with CIL do not reflect a unitary
underlying logic, and that CIL does little apparent work in guid-
ing national behavior. They also reveal how commentators and
courts commit errors of induction in moving from the observation
of a behavioral regularity to the conclusion that a CIL rule exists.
In addition, the case studies demonstrate that courts and com-
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mentators rely too heavily on what nations say at the expense of
what they do and why, and they tend to limit CIL to behavioral
regularities that are "good" from their normative perspective,
denigrating regularities that are bad as "comity" or a violation of,
or an exception to, the CIL rule.
Finally, Section IV discusses the implications of our theory
for other issues of international law, including the role of domes-
tic courts in enforcing CIL, the significance of treaties, and the
meaning of modern international human rights law.
I. STANDARD VIEWS OF CIL
The treaty and CIL are the two primary forms of interna-
tional law. Because they lack a centralized judicial and enforce-
ment regime, and because violations often go unpunished, many
scholars doubt that treaties and CIL establish genuine legal obli-
gations. CIL suffers additional doubts about its legitimacy that do
not burden treaties. Treaties are express promises that are al-
most always embodied in written form; they often have built-in
dispute resolution mechanisms such as international arbitration;
and they only bind signatories. By contrast, CIL is unwritten; it
is said to arise spontaneously from the decentralized practices of
nations; the criteria for its identification are (as we shall explain
more fully below) unclear; and it is said to bind all nations in the
world. Nonetheless, conventional wisdom holds that the obliga-
tions created by CIL bind nations with the same force as trea-
ties.3
CIL is typically defined as the collection of international be-
havioral regularities that nations over time come to view as
binding as a matter of law.4 This standard definition contains two
elements. There must be a widespread and uniform practice of
nations. And nations must engage in the practice out of a sense of
legal obligation. This second requirement, often referred to as
opinio juris, is the central concept of CIL. Because opinio juris re-
fers to the reason why a nation acts in accordance with a behav-
ioral regularity, it is often described as the "psychological" ele-
ment of CIL.5 It is what distinguishes a national act done volun-
tarily or out of comity from one that a nation follows because it is
required to do so by law. Courts and scholars say that a long-
See Restatement (Third) § 102, comment j.
See id § 102(2); Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art 38(1)(b), 59 Stat
1031, 1061, Treaty Serial No 993 (1945).
' See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 7-9 (Clarendon 4th ed
1990); Anthony A. D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law 47-55, 66-73
(Cornell 1971).
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standing practice among nations "ripens" or "hardens" into a rule
of CIL when it becomes accepted by nations as legally binding.6
This standard account of CIL suffers from well-known diffi-
culties.7 There is little agreement about which types of national
actions count as state practice. Policy statements, national legis-
lation, and diplomatic correspondence are the least controversial
sources. Treaties-especially multilateral treaties, but also bilat-
eral ones-are often used as evidence of CIL, but in an inconsis-
tent and undertheorized way. The writings of jurists are a com-
mon but highly tendentious source of CIL. Even more controver-
sially, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions and other
nonbinding statements and resolutions by multilateral bodies are
often viewed as evidence of CIL. Those who study and use CIL-
courts, arbitrators, diplomats, politicians, scholars-invoke these
sources selectively.
There is similar disagreement about how widespread and
uniform state practice must be. In theory, the practice is sup-
posed to be general in the sense that all or almost all of the na-
tions of the world engage in it. But it is practically impossible to
determine whether 190 or so nations of the world engage in a
particular practice. Thus, CIL is usually based on a highly selec-
tive survey of state practice that includes only major powers and
interested nations.' Increasingly, courts and scholars ignore the
state practice requirement altogether.9 For example, they refer to
a CIL prohibition on torture at the same time that they acknowl-
edge that many nations of the world torture their citizens." It is
thus unclear when, and to what degree, the state practice re-
quirement must be satisfied.
The opinio juris requirement raises more problems. Courts
and scholars sometimes infer it from the existence of a wide-
' See, for example, The Paquete Habana, 175 US 677, 686 (1900) CBy an ancient us-
age among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of
international law, coast fishing vessels ... have been recognized as exempt ... from cap-
ture as prize of war.").
' See D'Amato, The Concept of Custom at 6-10 (cited in note 5); David P. Fidler, Chal-
lenging the Classical Concept of Custom: Perspectives on the Future of Customary Interna-
tional Law, 39 German Year Book Intl L 198 (1996).
' See Karol Wolike, Custom in Present International Law 81-82 (Wroclaw 1964);
Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 Am J Intl L 529, 537 (1993).
' See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Fed-
eral Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv L Rev 815, 839-40 (1997)
(citing examples).
10 See Filartiga v Pena-Irala, 630 F2d 876, 882 (2d Cir 1980); Bruno Simma and Philip
Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles,
12 Austrl Year Book Intl L 82, 90-93 (1992).
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spread behavioral regularity." But this makes opinio juris re-
dundant with the state practice requirement, which, by assump-
tion, is insufficient by itself to establish CIL. To avoid this prob-
lem, courts and scholars sometimes require independent evidence
of opinio juris, such as a statement by an important government
official, ratification of a treaty that contains a norm similar to the
CIL norm in question, or an attitude of approval toward a Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution. 2 The appropriate conditions for the
use of such evidence are unsettled. In addition, there is no con-
vincing explanation of the process by which a voluntary behav-
ioral regularity transforms itself into a binding legal obligation."
Opinio juris is described as the psychological component of CIL
because it refers to an attitude that nations supposedly have to-
ward a behavioral regularity. The idea of opinio juris is mysteri-
ous because the legal obligation is created by a nation's belief in
the existence of the legal obligation. 4 Opinio juris is really a con-
clusion about a practice's status as international law; it does not
explain how a widespread and uniform practice becomes law.
We have described some of the many uncertainties that be-
devil the standard conception of CIL. These problems are well
known. They are the subject of an enormous literature that end-
lessly (and in our opinion unproductively) debates definitional is-
sues, the relative significance of practice and opinio juris, and
other conceptual matters internal to the traditional account. Al-
though our theory has implications for many of these issues, they
are not the focus of our analysis. Instead, we focus on two sets of
issues that are rarely discussed in the international law litera-
ture, but that are fundamental to understanding CIL.
First are the unarticulated assumptions that underlie the
traditional conception of CIL. Despite the many disagreements
within the traditional paradigm, the parties to this debate as-
sume that CIL is unitary, universal, and exogenous. CIL is uni-
tary in the sense that all the behaviors it describes have an iden-
tical logical form. CIL is universal in the sense that its obliga-
tions bind all nations except those that "persistently object" dur-
See Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law at 7 (cited in note 5) (citing ex-
amples).
12 Id at 7-9 (citing examples).
"For a catalogue of failed attempts, see D'Amato, The Concept of Custom at 47-56, 66-
72 (cited in note 5).
" D'Amato calls this the circularity problem of opinio juris. Id at 66 ("How can custom
create law if its psychological component requires action in conscious accordance with law
preexisting the action?"). He analyzes the many futile attempts to avoid this paradox. Id
at 47-56, 66-68.
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ing the development of the CIL norm.15 And CIL is exogenous in
the sense that it represents an external force that influences na-
tional actions. Our theory of CIL challenges each of these as-
sumptions.
The second set of issues concerns the traditional paradigm's
inability to explain international behavior. The traditional para-
digm does not explain how CIL emerges from disorder,16 or how it
changes over time. 7 For example, the CIL rule governing a na-
tion's jurisdiction over its coastal seas changed from a cannon-
shot rule to a three-mile rule to a twelve-mile rule with many
qualifications.8 On the traditional account, the process of change
is illegal, since some states must initiate a departure from the
prior regularity that they were bound to follow as a matter of law.
More broadly, the traditional account cannot explain why CIL
changes in response to shifts in the relative power of nations, ad-
vances in technology, and other exogenous forces.
The traditional account also cannot explain the fact that na-
tions frequently change their views about the content of CIL, of-
ten during very short periods of time. Nor, relatedly, can it ex-
plain why national courts and politicians almost always apply a
conception of particular CIL norms that are in the nation's best
interest. In addition, it does not explain why nations often say
that they will abide by a particular norm of CIL and then violate
their promises. Finally, the traditional account does not explain
why nations comply with CIL.
There are, to be sure, numerous general theories of why na-
tions obey international law. 9 The large majority of these theo-
ries focus exclusively on, and have relevance only for, treaties."
But some apply to treaties and CIL alike. Some positivist theo-
rists argue that nations obey international law-including CIL-
because they consent to it. 2 ' But, as many have noted, this posi-
's See Restatement (Third) § 102, comment d.
See D'Amato, The Concept of Custom at 4 (cited in note 5).
"See id; G.J.H. van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law 97-105 (Klu-
wer Academic 1983).
IS This is a simplification. We explore this rule more fully in Section III.C.
"For surveys, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
Yale L J 2599 (1997); Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, 8
Va J Intl L 300, 301 (1968).
See, for example, Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sover-
eignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements 1-28 (Harvard 1995). In ad-
dition, all of the recent empirical work on compliance with international law has focused
on treaties rather than CIL. See Koh, 106 Yale L J at 2599 n 2 (cited in note 19). For our
account of why treaties might foster international cooperation more successfully than CIL,
see Section IV.B.
2 See J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of
1999] 1119
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tion begs the question of why nations abide by the international
rules to which they have consented.22 A prominent theory in the
natural law tradition contends that nations abide by CIL because
"they perceive the rule and its institutional penumbra to have a
high degree of legitimacy," where legitimacy is understood as "a
property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a
pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because
those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into
being and operates in accordance with generally accepted princi-
ples of right process. '23 Another prominent theory argues that
"repeated compliance [with international law] gradually becomes
habitual obedience" as international law "penetrates into a do-
mestic legal system, thus becoming part of that nation's internal
value set."24 Yet another prominent theory, while nodding to the
idea of self-interested national behavior, mainly explains interna-
tional compliance on the basis of morality and the "habit and in-
ertia of continued compliance."25 "Right process," "value set,"
"habit," and "morality" are empty phrases in these theories. They
stand in for the concept of opinio juris without explaining what it
means. There are scores of other theories of international law
compliance," but they suffer from similar difficulties.
II. A THEORY OF CIL
This Section sets forth our theory of CIL. The theory uses
simple game theoretical concepts to explain international behav-
ioral regularities as a function of national self-interest. We are
not, of course, the first to invoke the idea of national self-interest
to explain the rules of international law.2" But this idea is in-
Peace 51-54 (Clarendon 6th ed 1963).
See id.
Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations 24-25 (Oxford 1990).
2Koh, 106 Yale L J at 2603 (cited in note 19).
' Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave 49, 58-63 (Columbia 2d ed 1979). The rational
choice strand of international relations attempts to explain international cooperation
without falling back on notions of morality or opinio juris. See sources cited in note 2. As
we explained, this is the tradition in which we are working, a tradition that has not to
date been invoked to account for CIL.
2' Schachter, 8 Va J Intl L at 301 (cited in note 19), lists thirteen theories. Koh, 106
Yale L J at 2599 (cited in note 19), canvasses dozens.
' For more detailed discussions of the game theoretic concepts that we draw on, see
Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner and Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law
(Harvard 1994), which shows how game theory can be used to understand law (but does
not discuss international law), and James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists
(Princeton 1994), which shows how game theory can be used to understand international
relations (but does not address international law).
See, for example, Lassa Oppenheim, International Law 4-8 (Longmans 1905).
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voked all too often in a vague and conclusory fashion; we aim
here to use game theory to provide a more rigorous account of
how CIL might emerge from self-interested international behav-
ior.
Several words of caution are in order. First, we use game
theoretical concepts only to organize our ideas and intuitions and
to clarify the assumptions made by us and those we criticize. We
do not claim that the axioms of game theory accurately represent
the decisionmaking process of a "state" in all its complexity.29 Be-
cause the premises of the theory are relatively crude, the theory's
predictions lack nuance. But a theory is successful if it provides a
more coherent and plausible account of behavior than rival theo-
ries do, and if it allows one to see old problems in new and fruitful
ways." The success of our argument, then, depends on both its
theoretical plausibility (the subject of this Section) and empirical
verification (the subject of the next Section).
Second, the theory is positive, not normative. We do not take
a position on the normative value of international law. Third, the
theory takes no position on the jurisprudential issue of whether
international law is really "law." Relatedly, although we express
doubts about the robustness of CIL, we are not therefore commit-
ted to thinking that domestic law is not robust. The purpose of
our argument is not to define law, but to explain international
behavior and its relationship to what people call "customary in-
ternational law."
A. The Basic Model
What courts and scholars call CIL refers to certain behav-
ioral regularities that emerge in international games played
among states. In this Section, we describe the four strategic posi-
tions that we believe capture the behavioral regularities thought
to constitute CIL. The analysis uses as its main example the CIL
rule at issue in the famous Paquete Habana31 decision, which held
that CIL prohibited a state from capturing a coastal fishing ves-
sel owned by civilians of an enemy state. For expository clarity,
we initially discuss possible explanations for this rule of CIL in
interactions between two states. We then discuss the extent to
which the conclusions of this discussion can be extended to inter-
We explore this issue further in Section IV.A.
For a discussion of the advantages and limitations of using game theory to analyze
international relations, see Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, in
Oye, ed, Cooperation Under Anarchy 25 (cited in note 2).
" 175 US 677 (1900).
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actions among more than two states. Finally, we explain how the
basic model differs from the traditional conception of CIL.
1. Coincidence of interest.
The first strategic position is one of coincidence of interest,
where states engage in behavioral regularities simply because
each obtains private advantages from a particular action (which
happens to be the same action taken by the other state) irrespec-





attack -2, -2 -1,2
ignore 2, -1 3, 3
Table 1 might describe the position of two belligerent states
that have navies that patrol a body of water also used by civilian
fishing boats from both states. A state's naval vessels are expen-
sive to operate and have important uses (such as protecting the
state from invasion), and the fishing boats are not worth very
much. It follows that each state does best if it ignores the fishing
boats of the other (represented by a payoff of 3 for each state). If
a state instead attacks the boats of the other state, we assume
that it incurs a loss of 4, so that its payoff is -1 (3 - 4). If the first
state's boats are attacked, it incurs an additional loss of 1, so that
its payoff is -2. If a state's boats are attacked, but it does not itself
attack the boats of the other state, it loses 1 but it does not incur
the loss of 4, so its payoff is 2 (3 - 1).
To determine the equilibrium of the game, assume first that
one player ("state j") attacks the boats of the other player ("state
f'). State i obtains a higher payoff (2) if its navy ignores the fish-
ing boats of state j than if it attacks and seizes these boats (-2).
Now assume that state j ignores the boats of state i. State i ob-
tains a higher payoff if it ignores (3) than if it attacks (-1). Ac-
cordingly, state i ignores state j's boats regardless of state j's be-
havior. Because state j's payoffs are symmetric to state i's, state j
ignores state i's boats as well. Thus, in equilibrium, each state
ignores the boats of the other state. By an "equilibrium" we mean
that the two states will continue engaging in this behavior as
long as the underlying payoffs do not change. Thus, when an
1122 [66:1113
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equilibrium occurs, one would observe a behavioral regularity-in
this case, a behavioral regularity consisting of each state ignoring
the boats of the other.
This behavioral regularity is one possible explanation for
what is referred to as CIL.3 ' Notice that the states act according
to their self-interest. Although an observer might applaud the
outcome because the states refrain from belligerence (and there-
fore seem to be cooperating or obeying some sort of rule), the out-
come is no more surprising than the fact that states do not sink
their own ships. States independently pursuing their own inter-
ests will engage in symmetrical or identical actions that do not
harm anyone, simply because they gain nothing by deviating
from those actions.
2. Coercion.
A second strategic position in which states find themselves
can be called coercion. One state, or a coalition of states with con-
vergent interests, forces other' states to engage in actions that
serve the interest of the first state or states. To understand this
strategic situation, imagine a game in which a large and powerful
state initially can threaten to punish any small state that en-
gages in any action X. The cost of punishing the small state is
trivial. The small state then chooses to engage in the action or
not, and the large state responds by punishing the small state or
not. The game then repeats itself. The large state receives its
highest payoff if the small state does not engage in X. The small
state receives a higher payoff if it does not engage in X and is not
punished than if it does engage in X and is punished. In equilib-
rium the large state makes the threat, the small state does not
engage in X, and the large state does not punish the small state.
The small state does not deviate because the large state would
punish it if it did. The threat of punishment is most credible
when the cost of punishing the small state is low.'
' Compare Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and
Strategies, in Oye, ed, Cooperation Under Anarchy 1 (cited in note 2). Oye argues that
states often obtain mutual gains by acting independently, and refers to the classical lib-
eral defense of free trade, according to which every state does best if it eliminates tariffs,
regardless of whether other states do. The example is slightly misleading because gains
exist only against the implicit baseline of protectionism. Our example of states not sinking
their own ships is formally identical, except self-interest leads to maintenance of the
status quo, rather than "mutual gains," except in the most attenuated sense.
This game is based on models of entry deterrence through predatory pricing in in-
dustrial organization. In those models, a firm or entrepreneur must decide whether to en-
ter a market dominated by a monopolist, and then the monopolist must decide whether to
retaliate by cutting prices and expanding production. Several different models show that
1999] 1123
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As an example, suppose that state i, a large and powerful na-
tion, wishes to prevent small state j from attacking i's civilian
fishing boats. State i threatens state j by announcing that if state
j does not stop its attacks, state i will destroy j's navy. If state i
cares enough about preventing j's attacks, and the cost of pun-
ishing state j is low enough, state i's threat will be credible, and
state j will cease attacking the fishing vessels. If, because it has
better uses for its navy, state i does not attack state j's fishing
boats, then observers will perceive a behavioral regularity con-
sisting of states i and j not attacking each other's civilian fishing
boats. They may conclude that a rule of CIL prohibits the seizure
of fishing boats. But this harmonious result is produced by force.
Indeed, the application of force is more obvious when the weak
party is passive. For example, state i might seize colonies of state
j and threaten j with destruction if j resists. Observers might
hesitate about calling the outcome a norm of CIL, but the struc-
ture of the game is identical to that of the first example.
Coercion and coincidence of interest differ according to the
degree to which a state's best action depends on the action of the
other state. Coincidence of interest exists when a state's payoff
from an action is independent of the action of the other state. Co-
ercion exists when the strong state's payoff depends on the weak
state's action, and the strong state would punish the weak state if
the weak state chose the action that does not maximize the
strong state's payoff.
3. Cooperation.
The third strategic position in which states find themselves
is that of the bilateral repeat prisoner's dilemma. Table 2 illus-
trates one stage of such a game.
the monopolist can deter entry either by making a credible threat that it will cut prices or
by in fact cutting prices prior to entry. In the simplest model, which we use in the text, the
monopolist cuts prices after entry in order to show future entrants that it will retaliate. In
another model, some monopolists are irrational (or prone to bad judgment) and others are
rational; irrational monopolists retaliate by cutting prices in the second period, while ra-
tional monopolists mimic the irrational monopolist in order to deter future entrants. In a
signaling model, the entrant does not know whether the monoplist has high or low costs,
and the low-cost monopolist signals its costs by charging low prices. In international rela-
tions, the analogies would be (i) powerful states sometimes being spiteful or irrational and
attacking weak states that do not do their bidding, even though the cost of attacking them
exceeds the benefit of successful coercion in a single round; or (ii) some powerful states
having cheaper and more effective militaries than others and occasionally engaging in
gratuitous displays of military might in order to reveal this private information to weaker
countries. For discussions of the predatory pricing literature, see Baird, Gertner and
Picker, Game Theory and the Law at 178-86 (cited in note 27), and Jean Tirole, The The-
ory of Industrial Organization 367-74 (MIT 1988).
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attack 2, 2 4,1
ignore 1,4 3, 3
Recall that the coincidence of interest example (Table 1) also
assumes that each state receives 3 if both states ignore the fish-
ing boats of the other. But while the earlier example assumed
that states lose 4 when they attack boats, because this strategy is
a waste of naval resources, the example here assumes that a
state gains 1 when it attacks boats, holding constant the response
of the other state. So a state's payoff increases from 3 to 4 if it at-
tacks the boats of a state that plays "ignore," while its payoff in-
creases from 1 to 2 if it attacks the boats of a state that plays "at-
tack" (see Table 2). The payoffs in Table 1, where there is a coin-
cidence of interest, describe conditions under which naval re-
sources are expensive, fishing boats have little value to an enemy,
and fishing plays a minor role in an economy. The payoffs in Ta-
ble 2, where there is a prisoner's dilemma, describe conditions
under which naval resources are cheaper, fishing boats are valu-
able as prizes, and fishing plays an important role in an economy.
The analysis of the prisoner's dilemma is familiar. State i ob-
tains a higher payoff from seizing state j's fishing boats, regard-
less of whether state j also seizes state i's boats (2 > 1) or not
(4 > 3). State j's payoffs are symmetrical. Therefore, if Table 2 de-
scribes the whole game, and there is no possibility of future ac-
tion or international sanctions, both states will seize the fishing
boats of the other, and the jointly minimizing outcome is ob-
tained.
When the prisoner's dilemma is repeated over an indefinite
period of time, however, the optimal outcome (ignore, ignore) be-
comes possible in each round.' If the states expect to interact
over time, it is possible that each state will ignore the other
state's fishing boats in period n+1 as long as there were no at-
tacks (i.e., "cooperation") in period n. However, if one state did at-
tack the other's boats (i.e., "cheat") in period n, the victim will not
cooperate in period n+1 or in any future period. This strategy can
' See Baird, Gertner and Picker, Game Theory and the Law at 164-72 (cited in note
27); Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists 82-99 (Princeton 1992).
1999] 1125
HeinOnline  -- 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1125 1999
The University of Chicago Law Review
yield cooperation over time, as long as several conditions are sat-
isfied. 5 We focus here on the three most relevant to our analysis.
First, the players must have sufficiently low discount rates:
that is, they must care about the future relative to the present.36
Individuals who are impulsive or impatient or who do not care
about the future have high discount rates. Because such indi-
viduals value the short term gains from cheating over the dis-
counted long term gains from cooperation, they cannot sustain
cooperative relationships with others. The international analogy
to the impulsive individual is the rogue state. Rogue states are
states controlled by irrational or impulsive leaders, or states with
unstable political systems, or states in which citizens do not enjoy
stable expectations. Such states can be modeled as having high
discount rates.
Second, the game must continue indefinitely, in the sense
that players either expect it never to end or to end only with a
sufficiently low probability. Care should be taken when deter-
mining the "end" of a game. Norms of war (such as the humane
treatment of prisoners) might exist because (a) belligerents fore-
see interaction ceasing at the end of the war but do not know
when the war will end, and so refrain from "cheating" during the
war (by, for example, killing prisoners) in the expectation that
the enemy will do the same; or (b) belligerents foresee interaction
continuing after the war ends, and fear that "cheating" during the
war may invite retaliation after the war. Analyses of customs be-
tween states, such as their treatment of each other's civilian
fishing vessels, should not overlook the influence of future inter-
action between the states outside the narrow context of the game.
Third, the payoffs from defection must not be too high rela-
tive to the payoffs from cooperation. Because payoffs may change
over time, a relationship may succeed for a while and then, after
a sudden change in payoffs, collapse.
"The conditions examined in the paragraphs that follow are standard in the game
theory literature. For more detailed discussions, see Baird, Gertner and Picker, Game
Theory and the Law at 164-72 (cited in note 27); Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scien-
tists at 260-79 (cited in note 27).
"Discount rate refers to the degree to which a person prefers current payoffs to future
payoffs. Suppose a person expects to receive 100 dollars in one year. A person with a high
discount rate of, say, 0.5 is indifferent between that amount in one year and about 67 dol-
lars today. A person with a low discount rate of, say, 0.1 is indifferent between that
amount in one year and about 91 dollars today. See Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied
Economists at 68-69 n 7 (cited in note 34).
' In more sophisticated analyses, this is not required: it is sufficient if players believe
the game will not end for a long time and there is a small probability that a player is irra-
tional or will make an error. See Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists at 279-91
(cited in note 27).
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The bilateral prisoner's dilemma results in a jointly maxi-
mizing outcome only if the above three conditions are met. By
contrast, the coincidence of interest case results in a jointly
maximizing outcome regardless of whether these conditions are
met. Thus, the value-maximizing equilibrium in the bilateral
prisoner's dilemma is not as robust as that in the coincidence of
interest case. But it is not banal. When it occurs, it reflects true
international cooperation.
The bilateral repeat prisoner's dilemma differs from the coer-
cion case along two dimensions. First, the cooperative equilib-
rium (in the prisoner's dilemma) depends on mutual threats of
deviation rather than the powerful state (as in the coercion game)
unilaterally threatening to punish the weaker state. Second, in
the prisoner's dilemma both states prefer the cooperative equilib-
rium that is sustained by mutual threats over the equilibrium
that results when both states deviate. In contrast, in the coercion
game the powerful state prefers the equilibrium sustained by its
threats, and the weaker state prefers the equilibrium in which
the threat is not credible and not carried out. Everything else
being equal, the coercion equilibrium might seem more robust
than the cooperative equilibrium, because the former requires
only the powerful state's threat to be credible while the latter re-
quires both states' threats to be credible.
4. Coordination.
The fourth strategic position in which states find themselves
is one of coordination. In the simplest form of this game, the
states' interests converge, as in the case of coincidence of interest;
but unlike the latter case, each state's best move depends on the
move of the other state. Consider Table 3.
Table 3
State i
action X action Y
action X 3,3 0,0
State j action Y 0,0 3,3
Each state prefers to engage in X if the other state engages
in X, and each state prefers to engage in Y if the other state en-
gages in Y. There are two desirable equilibria: {X, X} and {Y, Y}.
Once the states coordinate on one action, neither state will devi-
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ate. The main problem is the first move. If state i does not know
whether state j will choose X or Y, then state i does not know
whether to choose X or Y. Both states might choose their first and
subsequent moves at random, resulting in a mixed-strategy equi-
librium in which the parties fail to obtain the full gains from co-
ordination.s
A simple example is coordination on a border between two
states. Suppose that action X is "patrol up to the river," and ac-
tion Y is "patrol up to the road." The river and road cross but di-
vide the territory evenly. The states are indifferent whether the
river or the road should divide their territories, but they want to
avoid conflicts between their patrols. Once it is established that
the equilibrium action is X (or Y), neither state will deviate from
that action. To see why, suppose that state i knows that state j
engages in X. Then state i does better by also engaging in X than
by engaging Y. If instead state i knows that state j engages in Y,
state i does better by engaging in Y than by engaging in X.
Coordination problems also arise in the course of solving the
repeat prisoner's dilemma. Although repeat play can overcome
the incentives to cheat in one round of the prisoner's dilemma,
there remains a problem of identifying which moves count as co-
operative moves and which moves count as defections. For exam-
ple, part of state i's and state j's problem in overcoming the incen-
tives to seize each other's fishing vessels involves identifying
which seizures are permitted and which are not permitted. Can
one seize a fishing vessel if it contains spies? What if the sailors
are not spies but have observed secret maneuvers? A repeated
prisoner's dilemma, when discount rates are low enough, is not
the same thing as a one-shot prisoner's dilemma; it is instead a
kind of coordination game.39
5. On the possibility of multinational CIL norms.
One of the central claims of the standard account of CIL-
what we have called the "universality" claim-is that CIL norms
govern all or almost all states, or at least all "civilized" states.
For a discussion, see Baird, Gertner and Picker, Game Theory and the Law at 37-39
(cited in note 27).
"There are many variations on the pure coordination game. One equilibrium might
produce higher payoffs for both parties than the other; then coordination may be easy. Or
each party does better in a different pure-strategy equilibrium, in which case coordination
may be very difficult. This is the 'Battle of the Sexes" game. Morrow analyzes the treaty
on wireless communications as a Battle of the Sexes game, because all states preferred co-
ordinating on some standard rather than on none, but some standards benefited certain
states more than others. See Morrow, 48 Intl Org at 388-92 (cited in note 2). See also notes
111 and 168 below (discussing the Battle of the Sexes game).
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Our theory suggests that many apparently cooperative universal
behavioral regularities are illusory. Suppose, for example, that
we observe that no state seizes civilian fishing vessels from ene-
mies in times of war. Our theory contemplates many possible ex-
planations for this observation based on some combination of the
four games described above.
First, nations might not seize boats because their navies are
used more effectively by attacking enemy warships or large mer-
chant vessels. This is coincidence of interest. Second, many na-
tions receive no benefit from seizing fishing boats (coincidence of
interest), and the few nations that would benefit from seizing
fishing boats are deterred from doing so by powerful nations that
want to prevent seizures of their own boats (coercion). Third, two
nations decline to seize each other's fishing boats in a bilateral
repeat prisoner's dilemma, and all the other nations decline to do
so because of coincidence of interest or coercion. Or it may be that
the other nations also face each other in exclusive bilateral repeat
prisoner's dilemmas and therefore refrain from seizing fishing
vessels because they fear retaliation from their (single) oppo-
nents. (This might occur if all bodies of water containing fish un-
der the conditions described above are bordered by exactly two
states.) Fourth, some or all nations face each other in bilateral
coordination games that they solve, and any other nations engage
in the same action because of coincidence of interest, coercion, or
a bilateral repeat prisoner's dilemma.
There are numerous other possible combinations of coinci-
dence of interest, coercion, bilateral prisoner's dilemmas, and bi-
lateral coordination. In all these cases, some states refrain from
seizing fishing vessels because they have better uses for their
navy, or because they fear retaliation from the state whose fish-
ing vessels they covet. In none of these cases does multilateral co-
operation occur. To explain our skepticism about the spontaneous
evolution of CIL rules reflecting multilateral cooperation, we fo-
cus on the assumptions necessary to explain multilateral coop-
eration in repeat prisoner's dilemmas and in coordination games.
The n-state repeat prisoner's dilemma should be sharply dis-
tinguished from the two-state version of this game. An example of
the n-state game is a fishery surrounded by many states. Table 2,
which was used to illustrate the two-state prisoner's dilemma,
can also be used to illustrate the n-state version, except with the
interpretation that the row player represents any given state,
and the column player represents all the other states. Each state
does better by overfishing, whether or not other states overfish;
therefore, all states will overfish. One might ask whether the
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state would refrain from overfishing in order to avoid retaliation
by other states. The fishery could be preserved if all states adopt
the strategy of, for example, overfishing for all future rounds if
any single state overfishes in any previous round.'° This draco-
nian strategy, however, would result in the depletion of the fish-
ery if any single state cheated, or even if a single state mistak-
enly believed that another state cheated. As the number of states
increases, the cost of monitoring increases, and therefore the
likelihood of erroneous punishment and undetected free-riding
increases.
Recall also that we are talking here about the evolution of a
CIL norm, so the states would all have to adopt this strategy,
rather than any of the indefinitely large number of alternatives,
in order for cooperation to succeed. Probably for these reasons, we
do not observe such draconian strategies in the real world. Al-
though game theory does not rule out the possibility of n-state co-
operation, the assumptions required for such an outcome are
quite strong and usually unrealistic. For this reason, we doubt
the utility of n-player prisoner's dilemmas as an explanation for
multilateral or "universal" behavioral regularities.4"
Similar comments apply to n-state coordination games. Ex-
amples of n-state coordination problems include the division of
the world into time zones and the choice of international commu-
nication or transportation standards. In the latter case, every
state wants to facilitate transportation between territories, but
all states must agree on, for example, a railroad gauge. Once a
particular standard is established, no state gains anything from
deviating from it. If everyone uses the same gauge, a state will
likely lose by switching to another gauge because it will increase
the cost of interstate transportation.
To say that states face multilateral coordination problems is
not, however, to say that these problems have been, or can be,
solved in a decentralized way. Decentralized problem-solving is
very difficult because the costs of coordination rise exponentially
with the number of states. Imagine ten contiguous states that
must choose between different railroad gauges. If there are only
two possible gauges, and each state chooses a gauge independ-
ently, the odds that they will all choose the same gauge in the
first round are 1 in 210, or 1 in 1024. In later rounds, one state
might, at great cost, switch to the gauge used by another state,
See Michihiro Kandori, Social Norms and Community Enforcement, 59 Rev Econ
Stud 63 (1992), on n-player prisoner's dilemmas.
4" This skepticism is shared by others. See, for example, Oye, Explaining Cooperation
under Anarchy at 6-7 (cited in note 32).
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but at the same time one or more other states might switch to the
gauge of the first state. And if there are more than two gauges-if
there are dozens or hundreds of possibilities from which to choose
-the odds against coordination are astronomical. Over a very
long period of time, it is conceivable that the states might even-
tually settle on the same gauge, especially if some gauges are
economically superior." But this is unlikely.
One can imagine another exception to the general proposition
that multinational coordination games are not likely to be solved
in a decentralized fashion. Suppose that two states that are tech-
nological leaders play a coordination game that establishes a par-
ticular gauge. A third state that later develops the technology
might independently adopt this standard in order to minimize the
cost of transportation to the first two states. Other states then
imitate the first three states. Here, the original bilateral coordi-
nation game can establish the focal point to multilateral coordi-
nation.' While this result is possible, it is clearly difficult to
achieve, and we have found no example of it in CIL.
For the reasons discussed above, n-state prisoner's dilemmas
and coordination games tend to be solved, if at all, by treaty or
other international agreement, and not by decentralized evolu-
tion. We discuss this point further below." For now, it is suffi-
cient to understand that our hypothesis is that CIL norms that
have apparent universal scope are in fact the result of coincidence
of interest, coercion, or the pairwise interactions discussed above.
6. Comparison of the basic model and the traditional view.
The traditional perspective would not view a behavioral
regularity that arises from any of the four strategic situations
outlined above as an example of CIL. To see why, begin with co-
incidence of interest. In this situation, parties acting independ-
ently achieve their best outcomes regardless of the behavior of
the other party. In this strategic scenario, the behavioral regu-
larity of nations not sinking enemy ships is functionally identical
to the behavioral regularity of nations not sinking their own
' The model for such an argument would come from evolutionary game theory. See,
for example, H. Peyton Young, Individual Strategy and Social Structure" An Evolutionary
Theory of Institutions 25-90 (Princeton 1998). This model shows that as long as parties ei-
ther experiment or occasionally make errors, and as long as they interact frequently, par-
ties will eventually coordinate on Pareto-optimal actions. 'Eventually," however, may be a
very long time, and the games the model uses rely on institutional structure that is lack-
ing with respect to CIL.
We are indebted to Robert Keohane for this point.
See Section IV.B.
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ships. There are an infinite number of behavioral regularities of
this form that no one would claim constitutes law or custom.
None of these behaviors has anything to do with a nation's "sense
of legal obligation," which is so central to the traditional account.
Similarly, behavioral regularities explained by coercion
would not be viewed as CIL from the traditional perspective. The
behavioral regularity results from the dominion of the powerful
over the weak. Weak states do not act in the strong state's inter-
est out of a sense of legal obligation. They do so in order to avoid
retaliation.
Now consider a behavioral regularity that results from bilat-
eral prisoner's dilemmas. This behavior seems more meaningful
than in the other two situations. This is because in any particular
iteration of the game, each nation has a private incentive to
cheat. When a nation cooperates in a round, it appears to be com-
plying with a norm because it acts in a fashion not in its immedi-
ate self-interest. For these reasons, the bilateral iterated pris-
oner's dilemma approaches the traditional conception of CIL
more than the other two strategic forms.
But this explanation for an international behavioral regular-
ity differs from the traditional account in important respects. A
nation's "compliance" with the cooperative strategy in the bilat-
eral prisoner's dilemma has nothing to do with following a norm
from a sense of legal obligation. Nations do not act in accordance
with a norm that they feel obliged to follow; they act because it is
in their interest to do so. The norm does not cause the nations'
behavior, it reflects their behavior. As a result, behavior in bilat-
eral iterated prisoner's dilemmas will change with variations in
the underlying payoffs. Cooperation will rise or fall or break down
with changes in technology and environment. Although most tra-
ditional scholaxs acknowledge that states are more likely to vio-
late norms of CIL as the payoff from doing so changes, they insist
that the sense of legal obligation puts some drag on such devia-
tions. We, by contrast, insist that the payoffs from cooperation or
deviation are the sole determinants of whether states engage in
the behavioral regularities that are labeled norms of CIL. This is
why we deny the claim that CIL is an exogenous influence on
states' behavior. More significantly, the bilateral prisoner's di-
lemma cannot in any event be generalized to the situation of mul-
tilateral cooperation, which is such an important part of the tra-
ditional account.
Finally, pairwise coordination may emerge spontaneously, or
"evolve" into a behavioral regularity, but the resulting norm is
not universal. Multilateral coordination is, for reasons explained
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above, highly unlikely to evolve, but if it were to evolve, states
would not act as they do out of a sense of legal obligation, but
rather in order to further their interests.
B. The Origin and Change of CIL Norms
The basic model provides an account of the behaviors associ-
ated with CIL. We now show how each of the strategic positions
explains the origin and change of these behaviors. The examples
below are illustrative but not exhaustive. Our purpose is to show
that, under our theory, the way CIL originates and changes is no
mystery.
First, when CIL is used to refer to states whose interests co-
incide, a change in CIL will occur whenever the states' interests
change, and the states' interests will change when the environ-
ment changes. For example, states i and j seize each other's fish-
ing vessels at time 0, perhaps because they gain more by engag-
ing in mutual predation than by engaging in unilateral or mutual
restraint. At time 1, state k enters the scene and threatens the
security of both state i and state j. Now, states i and j have a bet-
ter use for their navies: defense against state k's navy rather
than seizure of fishing vessels. If one defines a CIL norm as any
behavioral regularity, then the CIL norm changes (from mutual
predation at time 0 to mutual restraint at time 1). If one defines a
CIL norm only as behavioral regularities that are "beneficial" in
some sense, then the CIL norm arises at time 1 from the disorder
that existed at time 0.
Second, when CIL is used to refer to the behavioral regular-
ity that results when one state coerces the other, a change in CIL
will again occur whenever the states' interests or relative power
change. State i loses its war with state k and also its power to co-
erce state j, so state j starts seizing i's fishing boats. The old CIL
against the seizure of fishing vessels is either replaced by a new
norm or by nothing, or disorder gives way to a new norm, again
depending on how one defines CIL.
Third, when CIL is used to refer to the behavioral regularity
in a bilateral repeated prisoner's dilemma, a more complicated
story is needed. One possibility is that CIL norms of this form can
arise when "neutral" behavioral regularities already exist be-
cause of coincidence of interest, but payoffs change, creating a
conflict of interest. To illustrate, suppose that at time 0 two
states fail to seize each other's fishing boats just because their
navies have more valuable opportunities. At time 1 these oppor-
tunities disappear (for example, a naval war with other states
ends), and consequently the one-round payoff from seizing fishing
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boats becomes higher than the payoff from not doing so. Each
country must now decide whether to begin seizing the other's
fishing boats.
At this point, the status quo-not seizing fishing boats-is
focal, in the sense that each state recognizes it as a possible de-
sirable state of affairs and this recognition is common knowledge
(i.e., state j knows that state i recognizes the status quo as a de-
sirable state of affairs, and state i knows that state j knows this).
One state might rationally hold off seizing the other state's boats
in the hope that the other state recognizes that this is a mutually
desirable strategy. Or, one state might not realize that payoffs
have changed, and the other state declines to alert the first state
to that fact by seizing its fishing boats, given that the other state
prefers to preserve the status quo. In either case, one might say
that a "mere" behavioral regularity based on coincidence of inter-
est gives way to a norm in which the behavioral regularity re-
flects cooperation. In contrast, if the status quo is that of mutual
seizure of fishing boats, it will be much more difficult for a pat-
tern of not seizing boats to arise, given that each state knows that
if it stops unilaterally, the other state will be tempted to continue
seizing boats.
It is not the case, however, that a "neutral" behavioral regu-
larity is a necessary predecessor to bilateral cooperation. Any fo-
cal point can stimulate the emergence of a behavioral regularity
that produces cooperative gains. Suppose that state i and state j
face the payoffs described by Table 2 above-a prisoner's di-
lemma-because of an exogenous change. Prior to this change,
each state seized the fishing boats of the other. The change could
be, for example, wars involving other countries, which require the
attention of each state's navies. Each state still prefers seizing
fishing boats to ignoring them in a single round, but both would
be better off over the long term if both refrained from seizing the
boats. There is no time for a treaty. State i might simply an-
nounce, "we will no longer seize the fishing boats from state j,
unless state j seizes our fishing boats." If state j knows state i's
payoffs, it might very well believe state i. The joint action of ig-
noring unless provoked is focal because of the announcement,
which is credible because each state knows that this strategy
leads to the optimal outcome. Thus, a CIL norm can arise despite
the absence of a long historical practice.
Fourth, when CIL norms arise from behavior in coordination
games, they can arise and change as a result of trial and error.
Recall the example of a coordination game in which armies patrol
an area of disputed land that is divided about evenly by a river
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and a road, and the river and the road cross at various points.
(See Table 3.) Suppose the soldiers want to avoid conflict, and
they know that conflict will arise if they patrol overlapping areas.
Both sides do best if they patrol up to the same boundary (either
river or road); they come into conflict if they patrol up to a differ-
ent boundary. If the river is a superior boundary, say, because it
keeps opposing soldiers farther apart, then the payoffs from the
river boundary would be higher and patrolling along the river is a
natural focal point. But even if both states do not choose this
strategy, so long as payoffs for identical actions are equal one
would expect eventual coordination on the same action, albeit
perhaps after an initial period of conflict. 5 And once the pattern
is established, no state has an incentive to deviate. We present
this example, however, as a theoretical possibility; we do not
think it explains behaviors traditionally associated with CIL.
C. Casuistry and Reputation
Some scholars believe that states comply with CIL because
CIL violations injure a state's reputation. However, it is hard to
see why reputation would play an important role in explaining
compliance with CIL norms beyond the limited sense in which it
describes tit-for-tat and related strategies in the repeat bilateral
prisoner's dilemma. The officials who direct a state's foreign pol-
icy must worry about their state's reputation among foreign
states, but at the same time they respond to domestic pressures
to violate international law that injures domestic interests.46
Moreover, as Keohane has observed, a reputation for compliance
with international law is not necessarily the best means-and
certainly not the only means-for accomplishing foreign policy
objectives.47 States can benefit from reputations for toughness or
even for irrationality or unpredictability. Powerful states, like the
United States, cannot be punished when they violate interna-
tional law, so they may do better by violating international law
when doing so shows that they will retaliate against threats to
national security (for example, Clinton's arguably illegal bombing
of Sudan). Weak states with idiosyncratic domestic arrange-
ments-like Iraq, Serbia, or North Korea-may benefit by being
unpredictable or irrational. As Schelling has famously shown, one
' See Young, Individual Strategy and Social Structure at 25-90 (cited in note 42).
4 See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games,
42 Intl Org 427 (1988).
"' See Robert 0. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics,
38 Harv Intl L J 487, 496-99 (1997).
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cannot coerce a person by threatening him if that person is irra-
tional.' One might conclude that all things equal, nations will
strive to have a reputation for compliance with international law,
but a reputation for compliance will not always be of paramount
concern because all things are not equal.
It is true, however, that states seem to care about their repu-
tations under certain circumstances. States make promises,
commitments, and pronouncements of intention to abide by CIL
and then try not to violate them in obvious ways. When they do
violate them, they do not admit to their violations, but rather jus-
tify their actions by reinterpreting their statements. Why do
states engage in such casuistry rather than admit the breach of
their commitments or remain silent?
A complete answer to this question would take us far afield,
but we sketch such an answer, because the phenomenon of state
casuistry might be taken as an objection to our thesis that schol-
ars exaggerate the influence of CIL norms on international be-
havior. We consider two models.
1. The rogue state model.
As is well known, a person who can commit himself to keep-
ing promises has more power than a person who cannot.49 The
first person can find partners in valuable joint endeavors; the
second person cannot. The same is true for states. A state can
benefit from international cooperation only if other states believe
that it will usually keep its promises. States try to keep their
promises in order to persuade other states that they are reliable.
To see how this works, imagine a game in which state i
makes a promise, state j relies on the promise or declines to rely
on it, state i decides whether to breach the promise, and then the
game starts over. State i wants state j to rely on the promise,
but state j will rely only if state i has a reputation for keeping
promises-that is, state i is civilized rather than a rogue state. At
any given round t, state j might rely on promises made by any
state that has kept all (or a major part of) its promises in the
past; likewise, state j will not rely on promises made by a state
, See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 6 (Harvard 1963).
"' See id at 43-44.
' This game is known in the literature as a "cheap talk" game because the cost of
making a promise is assumed to be zero. The crucial features of the model are that the re-
cipient of the promise does not have perfect information about the promisor's discount fac-
tor and that the promisoer's and recipient's interests are not too divergent. See, for exam-
ple, David Austen-Smith, Strategic Models of Talk in Political Decision Making, 13 Intl
Pol Sci Rev 45 (1992).
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that has breached many of its past promises. Thus, when state i
decides whether to breach a promise, it must take account both of
the immediate payoff from breach, and of the long-term decline in
its reputation from the breach. There are a variety of equilibria,
including the typical "babbling" equilibrium in which no one be-
lieves or bothers to make promises.5 One plausible equilibrium is
one in which state i keeps promises even if the promises are
against its immediate interest; as a result, state j believes that
state i is civilized. This result does not mean that states always
keep promises; rather, it means only that states will keep their
promises as long as the reputational gains exceed the short-term
benefits from breach.
Whether an action is a breach of a promise is not always
clear. When ambiguity exists, a state will always claim that it
kept a promise rather than admit to a breach. A state's insistence
that an action is consistent with a promise is an argument that
the state keeps its promises. In general, a state would not keep
silent or admit that it was breaking a promise-by so doing, it
would reveal that it did not keep promises. By insisting that it
kept its promise, a state leaves open the possibility that other
states will believe that it did; thus they will not revise their be-
liefs about whether the state is civilized or rogue.
The existence of casuistry, then, does not presuppose that
states are constrained by CIL. It presupposes only that some
states are more likely to be civilized than other states, and most
states would rather be classified in the first group. States pay lip
service to CIL in order to avoid the inference that they are rogue
states.
2. The coordination model.
Another reason why states keep their promises and try to act
consistently is that they receive payoffs when other states suc-
cessfully rely on their actions. Recall the two-state repeat pris-
oner's dilemma model of the fishing vessel exemption. 2 Each
state refrains from seizing the fishing vessels of the other state,
in the expectation that the other state will do the same. As we
noted above,53 this game involves a problem of coordination: what
counts as a "seizure" of a fishing vessel. The conventional wisdom
is that an illegal seizure occurs when the seized ship is small,
plies coastal waters, and carries live fish; it is not illegal to seize
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a large commercial ship that engages in deep-water fishing and
carries salted fish.
Suppose that state i's navy seizes a vessel that falls between
these categories-a large vessel that plies coastal waters. Per-
haps this form of fishing is new, made possible by technological
innovations. To avoid retaliation against its own small fishing
vessels, state i might say that it has complied with CIL, arguing
that seizure of the large boat does not count as a "defection" in
the repeat prisoner's dilemma. On this interpretation, the refer-
ence to a "norm of CIL" is an economical way of saying that one
has not cheated. The statement is not irrational; indeed, it may
have communicative value. If state j wants to maintain the coop-
erative outcome in the prisoner's dilemma, it may rationally re-
frain from punishing i, either because it agrees that in the opti-
mal outcome both states can seize large coastal ships, or because
it believes that i simply made a mistake. In the latter case, states
i and j might argue about what should count as cooperation and
what should count as cheating, and eventually settle on a com-
promise.
Both the rogue state and coordination models are incomplete.
But they capture important elements of reality, and show why
the existence of casuistry and argument among states over CIL
does not mean that CIL has independent normative force. Even if
CIL norms are the outcomes of prisoner's dilemmas and coordina-
tion games, it makes sense for states to claim they comply with
CIL, not to admit violating CIL, and to argue about what CIL
means. A CIL norm represents states' expectations based on past
behavior; arguments about CIL norms, therefore, are arguments
about whether expectations have been met or violated.
D. Summary
Our theory contemplates that behavioral regularities will
arise at an international level, but it suggests that these regulari-
ties will lack the robustness posited by the traditional account.'
Although we believe that similar game theory principles might explain the emer-
gence of customs among individuals, see Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social
Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J Legal Stud 765 (1998), our theory of CIL does not
commit us to any particular view about how customs govern individual behavior. In fact,
customs among nations appear to be less common and more fragile than customs among
individuals. This difference is probably explained by the many differences between the
factors that influence individual behavior and those that influence international behavior.
For example, individual action takes place in an environment of dense and overlapping in-
stitutions, including families, governments, churches, and workplaces, all of which sanc-
tion those who deviate from norms, habituate people to behavior consistent with norms,
and have roots that plunge deep into history and (in the case of the family) biology. Al-
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We identify four main strategic situations in which behavioral
regularities are likely to emerge: coincidence of interest, coercion,
bilateral repeat prisoners dilemma, and bilateral coordination.
Each pattern results from nations following their self-interest.
Behavioral regularities that reflect these patterns might not be
considered remarkable or desirable. But we claim that they-
rather than the notion of universal state practices followed from a
sense of legal obligation-account for the CIL identified by courts
and scholars.55 The demonstration of this claim is the burden of
the next Section.
III. CASE STUDIES
In this Section, we test the theory developed in Section II in
three areas: neutrality, diplomatic immunity, and maritime ju-
risdiction. These CIL rules are thought to be robust ones under
the traditional account.56 We argue that our theory explains the
evidence more persuasively than the traditional account of CIL.
A. Free Ships, Free Goods
The CIL of neutrality governs relations between neutrals and
belligerents during times of war. One important neutrality issue
is the status of enemy property on neutral ships. Before 1856,
many belligerents-especially Britain-seized enemy property on
neutrals' ships. Conventional wisdom among courts and treatise
writers holds that the principle of "free ships, free goods"
(FSFG)-all property on a neutral's ship, including enemy prop-
though international institutions exist, they are not as numerous, dense, and effective as
domestic institutions. In addition, because the individual decisionmaking process differs
from the national decisionmaking process (which involves bargaining and compromise
among many constituencies within a political framework), arguing about one on the basis
of an analysis of the other is hazardous. In short, interaction among nations and interac-
tion among individuals are separate phenomena, which are best analyzed separately.
' To be more precise, we show below that banal behavioral regularities-those that
arise from coincidence of interest, for example-are sometimes called CIL by scholars and
sometimes not. It appears that scholars are more likely to describe such regularities as
norms of CIL if the regularities appear to be different from those that prevailed at some
earlier time, and "better" in an unspecified way. So, for example, no scholar would call the
pattern of not sinking one's own ships a norm of CIL, but scholars would argue that a pat-
tern of not seizing another state's fishing vessels is a norm of CIL, even though the two
cases are formally identical. The difference appears to be that the implicit baseline in the
second case is an undesirable (in the scholar's eye) earlier period in which states seized
fishing vessels.
' Each of these three CIL rules is traditional in the sense that each governed inter-
national behaviors and flourished long before World War II. Since World War II, a new
form of CIL has developed-the new CIL of human rights-that does not track interna-
tional behavioral regularities. We examine this new CIL separately in Section IV.C.
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erty but excluding contraband, is immune from seizure-became
a well-established rule of CIL after the Declaration of Paris in
1856."7 The Declaration followed the Crimean War (1852-56), in
which France, England, Turkey, and Piedmont defeated Russia.
One of the Declaration's four principles was the FSFG principle.s
All parties to the Crimean War (including Great Britain) signed
the Declaration, and during the next fifty years most of the major
nations of the world acceded to it. In addition, the nations that
did not accede to the Declaration consistently announced adher-
ence to the FSFG principle at the outset of wars in which they
were belligerents. The broad accession to the Declaration, consis-
tent state pronouncements in support of FSFG, and the relative
paucity of overt violations of FSFG are the bases for the claim
that the FSFG principle was a rule of CIL after 1856.
In this Section we argue that the historical evidence supports
our thesis that there was no CIL rule of FSFG in the sense of a
universal behavioral regularity of belligerents not seizing enemy
property on neutral ships. Academic and judicial claims to the
contrary exemplify several errors common to analyses of CIL.
1. United States Civil War.
For its first seventy years, the United States was the world's
most ardent defender of neutral rights. This stance was designed
to promote trade and keep the United States out of European en-
tanglements. It included a firm commitment to FSFG, a strict
conception of blockade, and a narrowly defined conception of con-
traband.59 The United States did not sign the pro-neutral Decla-
ration of Paris because, as a relatively weak naval power, it ob-
' For statements of the conventional wisdom among treatise writers, see, for example,
C. John Colombos, A Treatise on the Law of Prize § 6 at 7, §§ 151-54 at 164-67 (Sweet &
Maxwell 1926); Phillip Jessup, American Neutrality and International Police 20-23 (World
Peace Foundation 1928); John Bassett Moore, 7 A Digest of International Law § 1179 at
382 (GPO 1906); Hannis Taylor, A Treatise on International Public Law § 651 at 721-23
(Callaghan 1901); Theodore Dwight Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International
Law § 186 at 302-03 (Charles Scribner's Sons 6th ed 1901). Compare William Edward
Hall, A Treatise on International Law 692 (Clarendon 5th ed 1904) (although "the freedom
of enemy's goods in neutral vessels is not yet secured by a unanimous act, or by a usage
which is in strictness binding on all nations, there is little probability of reversion to the
custom which was at one time universal, and which until lately enjoyed a superior
authority"). For judicial statements, see, for example, The Marie Glaeser, 1 Brit & Col
Prize Cases 38, 53-54 (1914) (dicta examining the widespread acceptance of the Declara-
tion of Paris).
W' See D.H.N. Johnson, Prize Law, in 4 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 154,
155-56 (North-Holland 1982) ('The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception
of contraband.").
See Carlton Savage, 1 Policy of the United States Toward Maritime Commerce in
War 1-82 (GPO 1934).
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jected to the Declaration's provision outlawing privateering." But
in light of its historic support for FSFG, it was no surprise that,
when its Civil War began five years after the Declaration, the
United States announced adherence to the principle that "[firee
ships make free goods ... with the exception of articles contra-
band of war."61
The United States' novel status as a dominant naval bellig-
erent provided the first real test of its commitment to neutrality
principles. It failed the test. In the "single incident in which the
question of free ships, free goods arose during the Civil War," a
United States Prize court apparently rejected the FSFG princi-
ple." More insidious to the FSFG principle than this overt viola-
tion was the United States' use of an unprecedentedly broad con-
ception of blockade and contraband to justify widespread disrup-
tion of neutral ships carrying enemy goods.
At the outset of the Civil War, Lincoln declared a blockade of
the entire coastline of the Confederate states. A blockade justified
a belligerent in seizing all ships-including neutral ships-at-
tempting to violate the blockade. The traditional United States
position was that blockades were legitimate only if they were "ef-
fective" in the sense of preventing access to the enemy's coast.63
Anything short of this strict definition of effective blockade would
allow a belligerent to declare a paper blockade and "assert a gen-
eral righi to capture any ship bound to his enemy," thereby un-
dermining FSFG and other neutral rights."4 American insistence
on the principle of effective blockades was one reason for the War
of 1812.65
When Lincoln declared the blockade of the Confederacy, one
Union ship covered each sixty-six miles of Confederate coast, and
nine out of ten vessels successfully breached the blockade; during
the war five of six blockade runners made it through.66 This po-
' See President Franklin Pierce, Fourth Annual Message (Dec 2, 1856), in James D.
Richardson, 5 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1897 397,
412-14 (Cong 1897).
" See William H. Seward, Correspondence Circular (Apr 24, 1861), in Papers Relating
to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Ses-
sion of the Thirty-Seventh Congress 34 (Kraus Reprint 1965).
' Stuart L. Bernath, Squall Across the Atlantic: American Civil War Prize Cases and
Diplomacy 7 (California 1970).
See Moore, 7 International Law § 1269 at 788-97 (cited in note 57); Savage, 1 Mari-
time Commerce in War at 25, 38-39, 45 (cited in note 59).
Jessup, American Neutrality at 24 (cited in note 57).
Id at 25.
Frank L. Owlsey, America and the Freedom of the Seas, 1861-1865, in Avery Craven,
ed, Essays in Honor of William E. Dodd 194, 194-201 (Chicago 1935). See also Bernath,
Squall Across the Atlantic at 11 (cited in note 62).
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rous blockade would have been deemed ineffective under prior
U.S. views about CIL." But Lincoln changed the United States'
stance, arguing that a blockade did not have to be totally effective
to be legally effective." The Supreme Court, sitting as a Prize
court, later ratified Lincoln's view as consistent with CIL.69
The United States' practice with respect to effective block-
ades undermined the force of the FSFG principle, because it justi-
fied the United States in preying on neutral vessels anywhere at
sea that were bound to a blockaded port. By itself, this practice
did not completely undermine FSFG, for a neutral could, in the-
ory, take enemy property to a neutral port for subsequent ship-
ment to the Confederacy. But the United States closed this loop-
hole too. In the early nineteenth century, it had vigorously pro-
tested the English practice of seizing American ships sailing be-
tween two neutral ports, which the English justified on the
ground that the goods were on a "continuous voyage" to a block-
aded port.y In the Civil War, the United States reversed course
and began to capture neutral vessels sailing between neutral
ports if the ultimate destination of the goods on board the ship
was the blockaded Confederacy."1 In so doing, the United States
engaged in generous presumptions about the goods' ultimate des-
tination that expanded the concept of "continuous voyage" beyond
even England's broad interpretation. The Supreme Court, sitting
as a Prize court applying CIL, upheld this broad conception too.72
The United States' liberal policy concerning blockade and
continuous voyage undermined the FSFG principle." This policy
was guided by expediency, not principle. The goal was to be as
' See Owsley, America and the Freedom of the Seas at 197-204 (cited in note 66).
"See John W. Coogan, The End of Neutrality: The United States, Britain and Mari-
time Rights 1899-1915 22 (Cornell 1981); Savage, 1 Maritime Commerce in War at 87-90
(cited in note 59). See also Bernath, Squall Across the Atlantic at 11-14 (cited in note 62).
"See, for example, The Springbok, 72 US (5 Wall) 1, 21-28 (1866); The Peterhoff, 72
US (5 Wall) 28, 50-52 (1866); Moore, 7 International Law § 1259 at 708-15 (cited in note
57).
, Bernath, Squall Across the Atlantic at 66-67 (cited in note 62).
' See James P. Baxter, 3d, The British Government and Neutral Rights, 1861-1865, 34
Am Hist Rev 9, 18-19 (1928); James P. Baxter, 3d, Some British Opinions as to Neutral
Rights, 1861-1865, 23 Am J Intl L 517 (1929).
See The Springbok, 72 US (5 Wall) at 21; The Peterhoff, 72 US (5 Wall) at 54; The
Bermuda, 70 US (3 Wall) 514, 551-58 (1865); The Circassian, 69 US (2 Wall) 135, 151-55
(1864). See also Thomas Baty, International Law in South Africa 13-17 (Stevens & Haynes
1900).
"See W. Arnold-Forster, The New Freedom of the Seas 31-32 (Methuen 1942) ("By
[an] irony of fate, the first country to contribute to [the] stultification of the Free Ships
rule was the very State which had been the rule's most consistent champion-the United
States .... Thus the United States began the process of stretching the rules of contraband
and blockade, and thereby walking through the Free Ships rule.").
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aggressive as possible in shutting down trade with the Confeder-
acy without provoking the British to enter the War on the side of
the South. In pursuing this goal, some United States officials
(such as Secretary of State William Henry Seward) were indiffer-
ent to CIL or tried to manipulate its requirements for strategic
purposes; other officials (such as Secretary of Navy Gideon
Welles) were ignorant or disdainful of CIL.74 There is no evidence
that the FSFG rule, to which the United States announced ad-
herence at the outset of the War, had any influence on the gov-
ernment's decisionmaking process, and the announcement of fi-
delity to FSFG was belied by the government's subsequent prac-
tice.
Following the American Civil War, other nations also ex-
panded collateral maritime doctrines to water down the FSFG
principle.75 For example, in the Franco-Chinese conflict of 1885,
the French embraced a broad doctrine of continuous voyage and
contraband to seize a ship carrying rice between neutral ports.76
Japan engaged in similar acts during the Sino-Japanese War of
1894, as did the Italians in their 1896 war with Abyssinia. 7
2. Spanish-American War.
In the next major war, the Spanish-American War (1898),
the United States and Spain engaged each other primarily
through naval power. Although neither nation was at the time a
signatory to the Declaration of Paris, both nations announced ad-
herence to its principles-including FSFG-at the outset of the
war.78 During the war Spain did not disrupt neutral ships that
" See Bernath, Squall Across the Atlantic at 12-17 (cited in note 62); Sister Mary Mar.
tinice O'Rourke, The Diplomacy of William H. Seward During the Civil War: His Policies
as Related to International Law (unpublished PhD dissertation, UC Berkeley 1963); Owl-
sey, America and the Freedom of the Seas at 194-256 (cited in note 66).
It is worth mentioning how subsequent actions by the United States are in tension
with the notion that FSFG had bite as a rule of CIL. In several bilateral treaties made af-
ter the Declaration, the United States recognized that the FSFG principle is "permanent
and immutable," but the contracting parties agreed to apply the principle only to the
commerce and navigation of nations that "consent [to] and adopt" the permanency and
immutability of "free ships, free goods." See Moore, 7 International Law § 1183 at 402
(cited in note 57). Similarly, several treaties after the Declaration acknowledged the FSFG
principle, but only in regard to the property of enemies who recognized it. Id. The United
States' assent to FSFG on various conditions of reciprocity suggests that the rule was not
binding on the United States as a matter of CIL.
" J.H.W. Verzijl, W.P. Heere and J.P.S. Offerhaus, XI International Law in Historical
Perspective 367 (Kluwer Academic 1992).
Id at 367-69.
"See President William McKinley, A Proclamation (Apr 26, 1898), in 15 A Compila-
tion of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 6474 (Bureau of Natl Literature); Span-
ish Royal Decree (Apr 23, 1898), translated in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of
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contained United States property. And despite controversial
blockades of a few Spanish ports and a mildly expansive contra-
band list,79 the United States enforced its belligerent rights in a
very narrow fashion. 0
One could interpret these events as support for the FSFG
principle. But closer inspection reveals that neither country had
an interest in disrupting neutral commerce during the short
three month war. Spain's Atlantic navy consisted of a handful of
"inadequately equipped, out of repair, and wretchedly manned"
ships81 that were blockaded in Santiago Harbor in Cuba before
they were destroyed. 2 Spain declined to prey on neutral com-
merce in the war not because of international law, but rather be-
cause it lacked the naval capacity to do so. The United States had
different reasons for not preying on neutral commerce during the
three-month war. There were few Spanish goods on neutral ships
for it to capture, 3 and the United States' overwhelming military
and strategic superiority meant that it had no strategic need to
prey on neutral ships.
3. Boer War.
The Anglo-Boer War (1899-1904) between Britain and the
two Boer republics (Transvaal and the Orange Free State) did not
portend a dispute over maritime rights. The landlocked Boer re-
publics had no navy, no merchant ships, and no coast to attack or
blockade. And the British were disinclined to attack neutral trade
because they believed that the Boers did not depend on it and be-
cause the British wanted to avoid reprisals from neutrals. For
the United States 774 (GPO 1901).
See Elbert J. Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American
War 196-204 (Johns Hopkins 1908).
Coogan, The End of Neutrality at 25-26 (cited in note 68).
"See Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-
1918 232 (Princeton 1966). See also Allan westcott, et al, American Sea Power Since 1775
221 (J.B. Lippincott 1947).
2 See Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime
Empires 418 (William Morrow 1974); David F. Trask, The War with Spain in 1898 257-69
(Macmillan 1981); Westcott, et al, American Sea Power at 230-32 (cited in note 81).
Spain's naval force in the Phillipines was destroyed less than two weeks after the war be-
gan, and thus never presented a threat to neutral commerce. See also Sprout and Sprout,
The Rise of American Naval Power at 231 (cited in note 81) (describing the Spanish vessels
in the Phillipines as "decrepit' and "ill-manned"); Trask, The War with Spain at 95-107
(describing the decisive United States destruction of the Spanish fleet in the Battle of Ma-
nila Bay).
"See Thomas Gibson Bowles, The Declaration of Paris of 1856 205 (Sampson Low
1900).
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these reasons among others, the British announced at the War's
outset that they would not search or detain any neutral ship.'
The British attitude toward neutrals changed following early
military setbacks and reports that the Boers were receiving sup-
plies through Lourenco Marques, the neutral port for Portugese
Mozambique that was forty miles by rail from the Transvaal fron-
tier. For several months in 1899-1900, the British Navy seized
American and German ships sailing from neutral ports to
Lourenco Marques. In so doing, the British government acted on
the basis of military expediency, and ignored legal advice that
such seizures would violate CIL and the manual of the English
Admiralty."5 The British government justified the seizures on the
grounds that the ships carried contraband goods and that there
was "ample ground" to believe that the ultimate destination of
the goods was the Boer republics. 6 The British conception of con-
traband goods was extremely broad, including foodstuffs." It also
employed a broad conception of continuous voyage.8
The British expansion of the contraband and continuous voy-
age doctrines vitiated the FSFG principle, just as the United
States' actions had done during the Civil War. In contrast to the
British response to the United States practice during the Civil
War, however, the British practice during the Boer War caused
the United States and Germany to threaten retaliation.89 In re-
sponse, Britain defended the legality of its actions, but it eventu-
ally stopped preying on neutral commerce and compensated some
of the affected German commercial interests."
The resolution of the maritime rights disputes in the Boer
War thus ultimately resulted in a behavioral regularity consis-
tent with the FSFG principle. But Britain did not obey the FSFG
principle out of a "sense of legal obligation." Britain began the
war with no interest in preying on neutral shipping. When its
strategic needs changed it reversed this policy even though doing
so violated the ostensible requirements of CIL. It then retreated
in the face of threats, which, if carried out, would have offset any
gains from interrupting neutral trade.
" See Coogan, The End of Neutrality at 30-31 (cited in note 68).
' For an excellent account, see id at 31-42.
" See Robert Granville Campbell, Neutral Rights and Obligations in the Anglo-Boer
War, 26 Johns Hopkins U Stud Hist & Pol Sci 153,230-64 (1908).
See id at 80-81.
U See id at 83-85, 96-97.
U See Coogan, The End of Neutrality at 36-41 (cited in note 68).
See Campbell, 26 Johns Hopkins U Stud Hist & Pol Sci at 111-12 (cited in note 86);
Coogan, The End of Neutrality at 38-42 (cited in note 68).
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4. Russo-Japanese War.
During the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), Russia took an
even more aggressive stance towards enemy property on neutral
ships than the United States during its Civil War and Britain
during the Boer War. Both Russia and Japan proclaimed adher-
ence to the FSFG principle at the outset of the war. But Russia
also claimed the right to seize and sink neutral ships carrying
contraband, and its contraband list "included food, fuels, and
other items of general use."91 Pursuant to these rules, the Russian
navy harassed, seized, and sometimes sank American, German,
and British ships, many of which contained only foodstuffs and
were not bound for a Japanese port.92 Enemy property on neutral
ships received no protection.3
Russian policy and actions provoked threats of retaliation
from Britain and (especially) the United States.94 The Russian
foreign ministry came to believe that "Russia stood to lose far
more by provoking Britain and the United States than it could
possibly gain by seizing a few cargoes of food." 5 Accordingly, as
Britain had done during the Boer War, Russia maintained the le-
gality of its policies but backed away from its aggressive anti-
neutral actions. Once again, the Russian action is best under-
stood as bowing to threats of retaliation in the pursuit of short-
term interests, rather than compliance out of a sense of legal ob-
ligation to a rule of CIL.
5. World War I.
The absence of a customary practice concerning the rights of
maritime neutrals-which was so evident in the United States
Civil War, the Boer War, and the Russo-Japanese War-was con-
firmed by the events of the Second Hague Peace Conference of
1907 and the London Conference of 1909-10. The Hague Confer-
ence was unable to reach agreement about the content of mari-
time doctrines--contraband, blockade, continuous voyage, and
" Coogan, The End of Neutrality at 44 (cited in note 68).
9 See F.E. Smith and N.W. Sibley, International Law as Interpreted During the Russo-
Japanese War 7 (Boston Book 1905); Sakuye Takahashi, International Law Applied to the
Russo-Japanese War 310-30 (Banks Law 1908).
' As one commentary on the Russo-Japanese War stated: "The entire absence of any
definition of contraband in the Declaration has left neutral commerce as exposed to the
encroachment of belligerent rights as before 1856. Goods which were formerly seized in
neutral vessels because they were the property of enemy subjects are now liable to seizure
on the pretext that they are contraband." Smith and Sibley, Russo-Japanese War at 227
(cited in note 92).
See Coogan, The End of Neutrality at 44-50 (cited in note 68).
Id at 50.
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the like-that belligerents had invoked to skirt the FSFG rule.9
The Conference also split on the American proposal to immunize
all private property from capture during war. When delegates
from the maritime powers met at the London Conference in 1908-
09, they were able to reach agreement on a substantive law of
maritime rights, including concrete definitions concerning con-
traband, continuous voyage, and blockade. But many nations
(most notably England) rejected the agreement, and no country
ever ratified it.
World War I began a few years later. It is well known that
the war destroyed any pretense of a law of maritime rights. Con-
traband lists expanded to include any item unless there was proof
that it was not destined for an enemy. 7 Blockades were clearly
ineffective and were extended to neutral ports.9 Blacklists, em-
bargoes, and mine-laying further disrupted neutral commerce.99
In short, all property on neutral ships-and especially enemy
property-was subject to seizure."° Scholars like to say that the
belligerents violated the norms of CIL; it is more accurate to say
that any behavioral regularities that emerged during prior wars
did not recur during World War I, no doubt because of changes in
technology, stakes, and interests.
6. Assessment.
The FSFG principle illustrates how our theory explains the
behaviors associated with CIL better than the traditional concep-
' See C. John Colombos, The International Law of the Sea § 502 at 440-41, § 941 at
766 (Longmans 5th ed 1962). The Conference did agree to establish an international prize
court, but this court never got off the ground. Id § 961 at 779-80.
See Jessup, American Neutrality at 37 (cited in note 57); Edgar Turlington, 3 Neu-
trality: Its History, Economics and Law, The World War Period 8-33 (Columbia 1936).
See Jessup, American Neutrality at 38-42 (cited in note 57); Turlington, 3 Neutrality
at 34-66 (cited in note 97).
See Jessup, American Neutrality at 42-50 (cited in note 57); Turlington, 3 Neutrality
at 36-48, 67-73, 80-86 (cited in note 97).
" Some prize courts stated during and just after the war that FSFG was a rule of CIL.
See, for example, The Marie Glaeser, 1 Brit & Col Prize Cases at 53-54 (dicta). But most of
these cases read FSFG so narrowly as to render it practically a nullity. For example, the
principle was limited to private enemy property; a belligerent could recover public enemy
property on a neutral ship. See C. John Colombos, A Treatise on the Law of Prize § 151 at
170 (Longmans 3d ed 1949). Similarly, FSFG did not prevent a belligerent from capturing
enemy property on one of its own merchant ships, see id at 179, or from capturing enemy
cargo loaded from an enemy to a neutral ship, see id at 162, or unloaded from a neutral
ship, see The Batavier H, 2 Brit & Col Prize Cases 432, 434 (1917). In addition, Prize
courts did not make captors liable for the destruction of goods on board neutral ships, Co-
lombos, Law of Prize § 93 at 106 (cited in note 57). By the middle of the war, even the pre-
tense of judicial adherence to FSFG had evaporated. See Jessup, American Neutrality at
44-47 (cited in note 57).
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tion. The theory better explains both the behavioral patterns that
are consistent with the ostensible CIL norm and the deviations
from the norm. It also reveals a variety of errors of generalization
typical of CIL analysis."1
In some of the wars during the period, belligerents and neu-
trals acted consistently with the FSFG rule. The best explanation
for this result is not, however, adherence to an exogenous CIL
norm from a sense of legal obligation. In each of the wars dis-
cussed, a belligerent's decision whether, and to what extent, to
forgo capturing enemy property on neutral ships was the product
of an assessment of its (usually short-term) interests. Belliger-
ents sometimes gained little from interrupting neutral trade and
"A similar analysis applies to the CIL rule recognized in the famous The Paquete
Habana, 175 US 677 (1900). Recall that the Court there held that CIL prohibited states
from capturing coastal fishing vessels operated by civilian citizens of an enemy state. In
support of this conclusion, the Court cited bilateral treaties stretching back over 500
years, state pronouncements, and the writings of scholars. See id at 686-708. This evi-
dence does not support the proposition that there was a universal practice of not seizing
enemy coastal fishing vessels from a sense of legal obligation. The scattered, pre-
nineteenth-century bilateral treaties that the Court cited belie the existence of a universal
customary practice, and indeed the Court noted that national acts consistent with the
fishing vessel exemption did not rise to a rule of CIL during this period, but rather oc-
curred (to the extent they did) out of comity or courtesy. Id at 694. The Court did think,
however, that nineteenth century state practice and the writings of jurists showed that a
behavioral regularity of not seizing enemy coastal fishing vessels had "ripen[ed] into a
rule of international law." Id at 686. But there are many problems with this claim. First,
the Coures own analysis showed that both state practice and the opinions of jurists in the
nineteenth century were mixed. See id at 696-700. Second, there were very few major
wars during this period, so there were few opportunities to test the proposition that states
would not seize enemy coastal fishing vessels. Third, there is little evidence that states
during those wars actually respected the CIL rule. During the Crimean War, the allies
violated the rule while Russia had no opportunity to violate the rule. As to the other wars
of this period, the little evidence that is available does not distinguish between the con-
ventional view and our more parsimonious coincidence of interest hypothesis. Although
major states relied less and less on prize over the course of the nineteenth century, this
appears to have resulted from changes in technology and tactics, see Douglas W. Allen,
Compatible Incentives and the Purchase of Military Commissions, 27 J Legal Stud 45, 59-
62 (1998), rather than from changes in international law. Indeed, jurists and courts ac-
knowledged exceptions to the CIL rule for military necessity and deep-water or commer-
cial fishing vessels, which strongly suggests that the rule had no force whatsoever. If
states did not have military (in the first case) or economic (in the second case) reasons to
seize enemy fishing vessels, then they would have devoted their navies to more valuable
opportunities, so the rule would not have constrained them in any way. The decision in
The Paquete Habana itself is consistent with the conventional view of CIL-that is why it
has such prominence in case books-but it is exceptional; there is no evidence that The
Paquete Habana precedent had any influence on the subsequent behavior of nations; and
there are-as far as we have found-no other cases from this time period in which a do-
mestic court held against its own government under similar facts. For a more detailed ap-
plication of our theory to the fishing exemption rule at issue in The Paquete Habana, see
Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, Chicago
John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 63, 59-70 (2d Series 1998), available
online at <http://papers.ssr.com/paper.taf?abstractid=145972> (visited Sept 8, 1999).
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thus did not try to do so. This "coincidence of interest" situation
was the position of England at the outset of the Boer War and the
United States throughout the Spanish-American War. Other
times belligerents gained much from capturing enemy goods on
neutral ships but lost more from neutral retaliation. This "coer-
cion" situation was the position of England later in the Boer War
and Russia late in its war with Japan. In those cases in which the
belligerent's desire to disrupt enemy property on neutral ships
was not checked by a superior threat of neutral retaliation, the
ostensible FSFG rule did nothing to prevent it from doing so. This
result-which can be seen as coercion as well as a coincidence of
interest-was the situation in the United States Civil War.
The FSFG example illustrates many changes in the practices
of nations that are consistent with our view that international
behavior is a function of nations' changing interests and relative
power. In contrast, the changes make no sense under the view
that nations abide by CIL from a sense of legal obligation. For
example, state practice and the rationalization of practice with
regard to the status of enemy property on neutral ships changed
in important ways from war to war. Thus, the United States as-
serted neutral rights liberally throughout the nineteenth century
except for the one time that it was a belligerent (its Civil War),
when it asserted unprecedentedly broad belligerent rights. Simi-
larly, England asserted broad belligerent rights in the Boer War
but protested when Russia asserted similar rights in the Russo-
Japanese War just a few years later. Germany vehemently pro-
tested the British anti-neutral practices during the Boer War but
engaged in aggressive anti-neutral acts little more than ten years
later.
In addition, the FSFG example illustrates several common
fallacies committed by international law scholars. The first is to
infer a CIL norm from verbal commitments to a rule of CIL. We
have seen that there was no behavioral regularity of not seizing
enemy property on neutral ships during the period in question;
belligerents invoked a variety of related maritime rights to con-
tinue preying on enemy property on neutral ships in much the
same fashion as in the pre-1856 period. As one commentator ob-
served:
[W]hile granting that the letter of the law [of "free ships, free
goods"] has been observed strictly, the conclusion that is
forced upon the student of recent practice is that, through
unwarranted extension of belligerent rights based upon re-
lated portions of the law of maritime warfare, the rule that
private enemy property is free when transported in neutral
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ships very nearly approaches nullity, and is only preserved
in some semblance of vigor by the influence of neutral oppo-
sition to the devices of belligerents for rendering it a "dead
letter."02
By focusing on pronouncements and the relative paucity of "di-
rect" violations of the FSFG principle, commentators have over-
looked the many ways in which the practice of seizing enemy
goods on neutral ships continued unabated.
A second error, an error of induction, is to view coincidence of
interest situations as examples of norm-following. For example,
in the Spanish-American War the United States did not want,
and Spain did not have the ability, to seize enemy property on
neutral ships. The nations were not motivated by a CIL norm. A
third error is the belief that the behavioral regularities associated
with an ostensible CIL rule possess a unitary underlying logic.
The FSFG example shows that such behavioral regularities have
multiple, and quite different, explanations. Nations sometimes
refrained from seizing enemy property on neutral ships because
they lacked any affirmative interest in doing so, and other times
because they feared neutral retaliation.
A fourth error is the belief that behavioral regularities in one
maritime context generalize to all maritime contexts. As the Boer
and Russo-Japanese Wars demonstrate, if a powerful neutral
makes a credible threat of retaliation, the belligerent might re-
frain from seizing neutral ships. But such belligerent acts are a
function of war-specific allocations of power and other contingent
factors that inform belligerent and neutral payoff structures.
There is no reason to believe that payoff structures that result in
this behavioral regularity in some wars will be present in all, or
even most, wars.
There is a final aspect of the FSFG story worth noting. Al-
though state practice during the period cannot support the claim
that FSFG was a rule of CIL, it is nonetheless striking that every
belligerent during the post-1856 period announced adherence to
FSFG as a principle of international law, and every nation at-
tempted to justify departures from this principle as consistent
with international law. We sketched above how claims of adher-
ence to international law can function as attempts either to sig-
"Harold Scott Quigley, The Immunity of Private Property from Capture at Sea, 11 Am
J Intl L 22, 26 (1917). For similar assessments, see Arnold-Forster, The New Freedom of
the Seas at 3 (cited in note 73); Baty, International Law in South Africa at 12 (cited in
note 72); Benton, Spanish-American War at 196 (cited in note 79); Colombos, Law of Prize
at xiii (cited in note 100); H.J. Randall, History of Contraband of War, 24 L Q Rev 449, 464
"(1908).
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nal that a nation is not a rogue state or to alert partners in a co-
ordination game that expectations have changed.0 3 Belligerents
want neutrals to believe that they can be trusted, so they will not
admit that they break their commitments to abide by interna-
tional norms. When circumstances change and states no longer
believe that they can profitably abide by their earlier commit-
ments, they announce a reinterpretation of these commitments,
rather than admit that they have violated them, in order to avoid
the inference that they will not honor other commitments they
have made along other dimensions of interaction.
B. Ambassadorial Immunity
Commentators have long agreed that CIL requires states to
protect foreign ambassadors and related personnel.' 4 This re-
quirement divides into two main components. First, the host
state may not harm foreign diplomatic personnel, either through
civil or criminal process or through extra-legal means. Second,
the host state must protect foreign diplomatic personnel from
threats posed by citizens of the host state. Although these re-
quirements have limitations, and they have fluctuated to some
extent over the years, the CIL of ambassadorial immunity-now
codified in the Vienna Convention'°S-has always been considered
one of the most robust rules of CIL. Diplomatic immunity from
criminal jurisdiction appears to be a particularly robust norm, for
diplomats do commit crimes with some regularity and immunity
from criminal jurisdiction is almost always granted.'" It is there-
fore a suitable test case for our theory of CIL.
'See Section II.C.
"'See, for example, Charles G. Fenwick, International Law 467-70 (Appleton 3d ed
1948); Montell Ogdon, Juridical Bases of Diplomatic Immunity: A Study in the Origin,
Growth and Purpose of the Law 8-20, 105-14 (John Byrne 1936); Lassa Oppenheim, 1 In-
ternational Law 457-60 (Longmans 2d ed 1912); Sir Ernest Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic
Practice 174-212 (Longmans 4th ed 1957); John Westlake, 1 International Law 273-81
(Cambridge 2d ed 1910); Clifton E. Wilson, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities 1 (Ari-
zona 1967); Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International Law at 133-38 (cited in
note 57).
'"Article 31 provides: "A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal ju-
risdiction of the receiving State." Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Op-
tional Protocol on Disputes, [1972] 23 UST 3227, 3240, TIAS No 7502 (1961).
"'For example, between August 1982 and February 1988, there were 147 alleged
criminal cases involving foreign diplomats in the United States, none of whom was prose-
cuted. See US Department of State, Study and Report Concerning the Status of Individu-
als with Respect to Diplomatic Immunity in the United States, Exhibit B, prepared in
pursuance of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988-89, Pub L No
100-204, § 137 (Mar 18, 1988). Similarly, from October 1, 1954, to September 30, 1955,
there were 93 criminal cases against diplomatic personnel in England and Wales that
were not pursued because of diplomatic immunity. Wilson, Diplomatic Privileges and Im-
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Our theory holds that a nation would grant ambassadorial
immunity either when it is in its private interest to do so or when
it participates in bilateral repeat games in which payoffs from co-
operation (as opposed to defection) are relatively high, discount
rates are relatively low, and conduct is sufficiently observable. In
this Section, we first explain why behavioral regularities con-
cerning ambassadorial immunity are consistent with the theory.
We then offer explanations for various deviations from the be-
havioral regularity of protecting ambassadors that are inexplica-
ble (except as "violations") under the traditional account.
There are several explanations for the behavioral regularities
associated with the CIL rules of diplomatic immunity. One is co-
incidence of interest. A host state will not harm a diplomat if the
immediate payoff from protecting him is greater than the payoff
from not protecting him. Whenever a host state harasses, arrests,
or expels a diplomat for any reason, it suffers an immediate cost,
namely a breakdown in the channels of communication with the
diplomat's home state. For this reason alone, if a diplomat has
not outraged the local population or engaged in espionage or
other activities that threaten national security, the immediate
payoff from harassing, arresting, or expelling the diplomat will
likely be less than the payoff that results from maintaining the
channels of communication. A behavioral regularity that exempli-
fies this logic would be a coincidence of interest.
This theory, however, does not fully explain states' treatment
of diplomatic personnel. It often happens that the payoff from not
protecting diplomats is very high. Iranians mobbed the United
States embassy in 1979 in part because they believed that the
United States was responsible for the Shah's regime. If the Ira-
nian government had restrained the mob, it would have suffered
a decline in its popularity among citizens. The local population
can be similarly aroused when diplomatic personnel violate local
criminal laws. Members of the British public were upset when an
American ambassador was not prosecuted after shooting to death
an intruder.0 7 The American Congress has considered several
bills designed to restrict immunity for certain crimes, such as
drunk driving.' More recently, the American public was aroused
when a Georgian diplomat ran over and killed an American teen-
ager in Washington, D.C., while driving under the influence of al-
cohol. ' 9 There are many similar examples. In all of these cases,
munities at 79 n 6 (cited in note 104).
" See Wilson, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities at 88 (cited in note 104).
"See id at 37.
'"See Knab v Republic of Georgia, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 8820 (D DQ) (appeal filed)
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governments responsive to popular agitation would receive a
relatively high short-term payoff by either seizing or allowing
others to seize diplomatic personnel.
This possibility suggests that the CIL of diplomatic immu-
nity might be better modeled as an iterated prisoner's dilemma.





harass 2, 2 10, 0
protect 0, 10 6, 6
Assume state j protects state i's ambassador. State i receives 10 if
it harasses state j's ambassador and 6 if it protects state j's am-
bassador. But, if state j harasses state i's ambassador, state i re-
ceives 2 if it harasses state j's ambassador and 0 if it protects
state j's ambassador. State j has symmetrical payoffs. These pay-
offs are most obvious during times of tension. Each state benefits
if its own ambassador enjoys security because the ambassador
can send and receive diplomatic messages and engage in espio-
nage. On the other hand, each state also benefits if it can success-
fully harass or harm the other state's ambassador, thereby pre-
venting the ambassador from engaging in espionage, without
causing a breakdown of communication with the ambassador's
home state. But if both states harass the ambassador of the
other, then communication breaks down and the suboptimal
equilibrium results.
In these circumstances, diplomatic immunity is a bilateral
prisoner's dilemma, and can be solved only if the conditions of
two-state cooperation are met. They usually are. Relations be-
tween two states are almost always indefinitely long games. The
benefits from diplomatic communication are high, but these bene-
fits are always spread out over the long term. Short-term devia-
tions may be tempting because of local or temporary political cir-
cumstances, but are unlikely to exceed the long-term benefit of
communication. When a diplomat from state j commits a crime,
state i has an interest in enforcing its criminal laws against the
diplomat to preserve the integrity of the criminal law and prevent
(upholding diplomaes civil immunity).
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local unrest. But if i prosecutes the diplomat, it suffers more than
just a breakdown in communication with j, for j has a hostage in
the person of i's ambassador and may retaliate by harming i's
ambassador." °
These adverse consequences from enforcing local criminal
law against j's diplomat mean that i will receive a larger payoff
from nonenforcement if j refrains in similar circumstances. Al-
though a diplomat may impose costs on a host state by commit-
ting crimes, the host state refrains from punishing him because it
wants to maintain its own diplomat in the foreign state. This co-
operative strategy (immunity) has a clear all-or-nothing quality
that is relatively easy to monitor; indeed, the all-or-nothing qual-
ity of states' responses are probably intended to avoid ambiguity.
Each nation's response to a violation of the immunity rule (retali-
ate) is clear and easy to enforce."' And nations that successfully
maintain long-term diplomatic relations are usually relatively
stable states, rather than rogue or revolutionary states, consis-
tent with the assumption that cooperation can be achieved pri-
marily when parties have low discount rates.
At first glance, the robust ambassadorial immunity rule ap-
pears to be a counterexample to our claim that robust multina-
tional behavioral regularities are not likely to exist."' In fact, it
shows the opposite. It illustrates our claim that a universal be-
havioral regularity may develop as an amalgam of independent,
bilateral repeat prisoner's dilemmas. The logic of ambassadorial
immunity-the sending and receiving of diplomats, the monitor-
ing of diplomatic activities, the breakdown in communication and
retaliation that follow harm to a diplomat, and so forth-takes
place within, and is fully explained by, bilateral relations. The
fact that states i and j have diplomatic relations with numerous
"See, for example, Wilson, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities at 56 (cited in note
104) (following Brazilian mob attack on Russian diplomats, Soviets held Brazilian "am-
bassador under surveillance as hostage until the safe departure of Russian diplomats from
Brazil was assured").
'A perhaps more accurate game-theoretic representation of diplomatic immunity is
the Battle of the Sexes game. If state X knows that state Y will harm X's diplomat, X will
want to protect Y's diplomat in order to keep communications open. If state Y knows that
state X will harm 's diplomat, Y will want to protect X's diplomat in order to keep com-
munications open. Both of these outcomes are equilibria, but the more plausible outcome
is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each state harms foreign diplomats with some
probability p, and protects them with probability 1-p. In other words, one would observe
occasional but not constant violations of diplomatic immunity, depending on the relative
payoffs from violation and protection. To keep our analysis consistent with our analysis in
earlier sections, we ignore these complications (without, we think, sacrificing much accu-
racy). For a discussion of the Battle of the Sexes game, see, for example, Morrow, Game
Theory for Political Scientists at 91-93 (cited in note 27).
"'See Section II.A.5.
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other states is irrelevant; relations with third countries do no
work in explaining the diplomatic immunity rule. Far from being
a multilateral norm, and far from being a manifestation of states'
sense of legal obligation, ambassadorial immunity reflects equi-
libria that arise independently from strategic behavior in pair-
wise interactions among all states.
Abundant evidence supports this claim. When diplomatic
immunity is denied or postponed, the diplomat's country often re-
taliates, but third countries do not. For example, in 1961 the So-
viet Union expelled the Dutch ambassador in protest of the Dutch
police's alleged mishandling of the Soviet ambassador, but no
other nations retaliated."' Only in egregious cases do otherwise-
uninvolved states retaliate against another state for violating
diplomatic immunity, and even in these cases retaliation is nei-
ther universal nor significant. Consider the Iranian invasion of
the American embassy. No country pulled its embassy from Iran,
and the United Nations failed to impose sanctions."4 Only the
United States' closest allies-the European Community nations
and Japan-imposed economic sanctions. They did so late,
grudgingly, and in response to enormous pressure from the
United States."5 The sanctions they finally did impose were gen-
erally acknowledged to be ineffectual, empty gestures."6
We have explained how our theory accounts for a general be-
havioral regularity of states protecting diplomats. But contrary to
the traditional account, our theory does not predict equilibrium
behavior to be identical among all states. It is one thing to say, at
a high level of generality, that nations respect diplomatic immu-
nity and that immunity equilibria resemble each other. This is
not surprising because the same basic strategic game is being
played by states in the same basic position. States exchange am-
bassadors for communicative benefits, they are sometimes
tempted to prosecute foreign ambassadors or to fail to protect
them from harm, they risk a breakdown in communications and
retaliation against their ambassador if they fail to protect foreign
ambassadors, and they can hold foreign ambassadors as hostages
if foreign nations harm their own ambassadors. But our theory
predicts that details of behavior will vary in important respects
"' See Wilson, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities at 68 n 145 (cited in note 104).
... See Linda S. Frey and Marsha L. Frey, The History of Diplomatic Immunity 480,
519 (Ohio State 1999).
"'See id at 519; How to be a good ally without putting oneself out, Economist 77 (Apr
19, 1980); Tom Matthews, et al, Running Out of Sanctions, Newsweek 22 (Apr 28, 1980).
"'See Frey and Frey, History of Diplomatic Immunity at 480, 518-19 (cited in note
114); Iranian sanctions-scarcely worth bothering to bust, Economist 47 (June 7, 1980).
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when the relationships among states vary. The evidence is too
sketchy to confirm or falsify these hypotheses with rigor. But it is
highly suggestive."'
The first claim is that rogue states violate the norms of dip-
lomatic immunity more often than civilized states do. When
states have unstable political institutions, their leaders weigh
short-term payoffs more heavily than leaders in other states do.
As a result, they are more willing to risk retaliation in order to
obtain any payoffs from violating diplomatic immunity in the
present. Available empirical evidence shows that developing
countries, countries in the throes of revolution, and countries con-
trolled by unstable dictators violate diplomatic immunity more
frequently than "civilized states" do."' The Iran hostage crisis is a
prominent example, but so too are the 1967 attack on the British
embassy by supporters of the Cultural Revolution in China and
the 1958 Iraqi military coup that resulted in the burning of the
British embassy."' Relatedly, a survey of U.S. Foreign Service Of-
ficers indicated that "the extent of protection in so-called 'civilized
countries' was greater than in the newly emerging nations," and
that in these emerging nations, "the degree of protection appar-
ently sometimes coincided with the level of political stability and
the role of the political leader."20 There are many similar exam-
ples.12'
The second claim is that states are more likely to violate
diplomatic immunity when stakes change, so that the benefits of
violating immunity (for example, quelling a popular outcry) are
very high or the benefits of respecting immunity (for example,
maintaining communication with a state) are low. Several obser-
vations are consistent with this claim. Perhaps the most frequent
denial of diplomatic immunity occurs when the diplomat does
"' Notice that a violation of diplomatic immunity will not necessarily be overt. If one
state credibly threatens to violate diplomatic immunity, a second state may grant a waiver
in order to avoid an open breach. Consider, as a possible example, Knab, 1998 US Dist
LEXIS 8820 (Republic of Georgia waived immunity to criminal prosecution).
"'See Frey and Frey,'History of Diplomatic Immunity at 503-07 (cited in note 114);
Grant V. McClanahan, Diplomatic Immunity: Principles, Practices, Problems 142-46 (St
Martin's 1989); Wilson, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities at 50-51 (cited in note 104).
See also Wilson, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities at 50 nn 31-32 (concerning the dif-
ference between civilized and uncivilized nations).
""McClanahan, Diplomatic Immunity at 145, 181 (cited in note 118). See also id at 144
("The behavior of revolutionary regimes in the past thirty years has also frequently failed
to meet accepted standards of international behavior with respect to diplomatic immu-
nity."); Wilson, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities at 68-70 (cited in note 104).
" Wilson, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities at 50 (cited in note 104).
... See id at 51-52, 62-63, 82, 86.
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something in the host state that threatens its national security.'22
To take two examples: The British seized Swedish Ambassador
Count Gyllenborg in 1917 in connection with a plot to overthrow
George I;12 and in 1914 the United States arrested and seized the
papers of an attache of the German embassy who was conspiring
against the neutrality of the United States.124 When a nation's se-
curity is threatened, it receives a heightened payoff from com-
promising diplomatic immunity. Another example is the well-
documented mistreatment of diplomats behind the iron curtain at
the onset of the Cold War.'25 The communist states were closed
societies that often arrested, detained, and harassed diplomats-
in violation of accepted immunity principles-in order to deter
their travel, inquiries, and photography within the host state.12
Wilson refers to this trend as a "retrogression" from traditional
practice. 27 The retrogression makes sense: the communist states
suffered more than noncommunist states from enforcement of the
traditional CIL of diplomatic immunity, because in a closed soci-
ety ordinary observation is more damaging than in an open soci-
ety.
The third claim is that respect for diplomatic immunities, far
from being universal, is sensitive to variations in bilateral rela-
tions among states over time. The Soviet Union mistreated for-
eign diplomats with greater regularity than Russia before and af-
ter the Soviet Union; the United States and the Soviet Union
subjected each other's diplomats to more harassment during the
Cold War than at other times; and states in the Eastern block
treated diplomats from the West with less respect than they
treated diplomats from fellow Eastern block nations.'28 The ex-
planation for these variations is that the diplomats of one's ene-
mies pose a greater threat to security than the diplomats of one's
friends; so, when dealing with one's enemies, the payoff from
violating diplomatic immunity will often be higher than the cost.
By contrast, the traditional view explains ambassadorial immu-
"See id at 82 ("[R]ules of immunity from criminal jurisdiction are... modified when
the envoy's conduct threatens the safety and security of the host state."). See generally id
at 82-86.
' See Diplomatic Immunity and the Criminal Law, 68 L J 226 (1929).
uWilson, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities at 83 (cited in note 104). See also
United States v Coplon, 84 F Supp 472 (S D NY 1949).
'"See McClanahan, Diplomatic Immunity at 143-44 (cited in note 118); Wilson, Dip-
lomatic Privileges and Immunities at 55 (cited in note 104).
" Wilson, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities at 62-70 (cited in note 104).
"Id at 71.
See id at 55-56, 62-70, 71-72.
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nity by asserting the existence of a norm, but it cannot explain
the many deviations from the norm.
C. Territorial Sea
Prior to the eighteenth century, many powerful maritime na-
tions proclaimed control over large areas of the ocean. These na-
tions were unable to sustain their claims, however, and by the
eighteenth century the seas became viewed as free areas that no
nation could appropriate.'29 One limitation on this so-called "free-
dom of the seas" was the power that a nation retained over the
territorial sea adjacent to its coast. According to the doctrine of
territorial jurisdiction, a nation had plenary jurisdiction within
its territorial sea and no jurisdiction without it. Other nations
could freely exploit and navigate the sea up to the boundary of a
nation's territorial sea. But they could no more operate within a
nation's territorial sea without the nation's permission than they
could operate in a nation's territory without permission.
Jurists originally conceived the territorial sea as the water a
nation defended in order to protect its territorial sovereignty. 3 '
Bynkershoek famously captured the idea with the statement that
"[t]he power of the land properly ends where the force of arms
ends.""' In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the territo-
rial sea did not have a settled breadth." ' During this time
Bynkershoek's dictum transformed into the idea that a nation's
sovereignty over the sea extended as far as it could fire a cannon-
ball from its shores. By the end of the eighteenth century, many
who embraced the cannon-shot rule began to identify it with a
three-mile breadth, the approximate distance that cannonballs
could be projected at the time."'
Conventional wisdom holds that a three-mile territorial sea
was a rule of CIL during most of the nineteenth and the first half
of the twentieth century."4 The basis for this conventional wis-
" See Bernard G. Heinzen, The Three-Mile Limit- Preserving the Freedom of the Seas,
11 Stan L Rev 597, 598-601 (1959); Philip C. Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and
Maritime Jurisdiction 3-6 (G.A..Jennings 1927).
'See Jessup, Territorial Waters at 5 (cited in note 129).
"' Cornelis Van Bynkershoek, De Dominio Marls Dissertatio 44 (Oxford 1923) (Ralph
Van Deman Magoffin, trans) (translation of 1744 edition).
"See Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law at 187-88 (cited in note 5).
" See R.R. Churchill and AV. Lowe, The law of the sea 59 (Manchester 1983).
"For a few of the many examples, see Thomas Baty, The Three-Mile Limit, 22 Am J
Intl L 503 (1928); M. Charles Calvo, 1 Le Droit International Theoretique et Pratique 479-
80 (5th ed 1896); Martin Conboy, The Territorial Sea, 2 Can Bar Rev 8, 18 (1924); Hein-
zen, 11 Stan L Rev at 629, 634 (cited in note 129); Amos S. Hershey, The Essentials of In-
ternational Public Law 195-96 (MacMillan 1912); Charles Cheney Hyde, 1 International
1158 [66:1113
HeinOnline  -- 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1158 1999
Theory of Customary International Law
dom is as follows. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the
three-mile rule was officially championed by several countries-
most notably England and the United States-as a rule of CIL.135
Many nations that attempted to assert a broader jurisdiction
than three miles retracted these claims in the face of threats or
protests, usually from the United States or England.136 Some-
times nations paid damages after asserting jurisdiction beyond
the three-mile range.'37 The three-mile rule also appeared in nu-
merous international agreements."3 And it was broadly-though
not unanimously-supported by jurists.'39
The most immediate problem with the traditional account is
that as many nations rejected the three-mile rule as adhered to
it. 4' The Scandinavian countries always asserted at least a four-
Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States § 141 at 251-53 (Little,
Brown 1922); Jessup, Territorial Waters at 62-66 (cited in note 129); Oppenheim, 1 Inter-
national Law at 257 (cited in note 104); Charles Pergler, Judicial Interpretation of Inter-
national Law in the United States 105-07 (MacMillan 1928); Sir Robert Phillimore, 1
Commentaries Upon International Law 274-75 (Butterworths 3d ed 1879); Westlake, 1 In.
ternational Law at 167 (cited in note 104). For further examples, see Stefan A. Riesenfeld,
Protection of Coastal Fisheries Under International Law 29-98 (1942).
"See Colombos, The International Law of the Sea §§ 105-07 at 85-88 (cited in note
96); Heinzen, 11 Stan L Rev at 617-19 (cited in note 129); Jessup, Territorial Waters at 62-
63 (cited in note 129).
'"For examples, see Heinzen, 11 Stan L Rev at 630-32 (cited in note 129).
"For examples, see id at 636.
'"Most prominently, the Great Britain-United States Fishing Treaty, Convention be-
tween the United States of America and His Britannic Majesty, Respecting Fisheries,
Boundary, and Restoration of Slaves, 18 Stat 297, 298, Treaty Ser No 112(2) (1818); the
North Sea Fisheries Convention, Convention between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and Turkey, Respecting the Free
Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal (Oct 29, 1882), in Sir Edward Hertslet and Ed-
ward Cecil Hertslet, eds, 79 British and Foreign State Papers 18, 20 (Harrison & Sons);
and the Suez Canal Convention, Convention between Great Britain, Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, and the Netherlands, for regulating the Police of the North Sea Fisher-
ies (May 6, 1888), in Sir Edward Cecil Hertselt, ed, 73 British and Foreign State Papers
39, 41 (William Ridgeway 1889).
" For a summary of the views ofjurists on this point during the period 1800-1942, see
Riesenfeld, Protection of Coastal Fisheries at 29-98 (cited in note 134). Prominent skeptics
of the ostensible CIL three-mile rule (who wrote in English) include James Brierly, The
Law of Nations 102-09 (Clarendon 1928); William Edward Hall, International Law 126-29
(Clarendon 1880); and Riesenfeld, Protection of Coastal Fisheries at 135-71. For general
discussions, see also Thomas Wemyss Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea (Blackwood
1911); Christopher B.V. Meyer, The Extent of Jurisdiction in Coastal Waters (Sijthoff
1937).
" See Riesenfeld, Protection of Coastal Fisheries at 129-250 (cited in note 134). Riesen-
feld summarized his comprehensive 1942 examination of state practice by concluding.
[Tihere are many states, like Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Es-
tonia, Germany, Great Britain and the Dominions, Iceland, Japan, Latvia, the Neth-
erlands, Poland, the United States and Venezuela, which generally speaking adhere
to the three-mile rule. On the other hand, there are likewise many other nations
which do not adhere at all to this principle, or do so only to a very limited extent,
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mile territorial sea;' Spain and Portugal consistently asserted
that the territorial jurisdiction band was six miles wide; Russia
(and later the U.S.S.R.) frequently asserted claims beyond the
three-mile band;" and various other less significant countries
claimed jurisdiction beyond the three-mile band.' It is true that
some of these nations sometimes asserted jurisdiction only up to
three miles in the face of threats of retaliation, usually from
England or the United States. To take one of many examples, in
1821 Russia claimed jurisdiction up to "100 Italian miles" off the
coasts of Eastern Siberia and Alaska, but ultimately agreed to a
three-mile rule by treaty with England and the United States
following protests from both countries.' In these latter cases, the
resulting behavioral regularity is best explained by coercion
rather than by a CIL norm. It is no coincidence that the most suc-
cessful enforcers of the three-mile rule were Britain, the preemi-
nent naval power, and the United States, a burgeoning naval
power-both states with a strong interest in limiting encroach-
ment on the freedom of the seas, and the power to enforce these
interests. However, even these powerful states were often unable
to make credible threats to enforce the rule; threats, and espe-
cially complaints, were often not heeded, and practice inconsis-
tent with the three-mile rule frequently went unabated."
The absence of a customary state practice is confirmed by the
debates and resolutions in various official conferences throughout
the period, which reveal stark disagreement about the breadth of
such as Argentina, Columbia, Cuba, Finland, France, Greece, Honduras; Italy, Mex-
ico, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay, and
Yugoslavia.
Id at 280. Jessup's 1927 survey reached broadly similar conclusions about state practice,
but nonetheless maintained that a core three-mile CIL rule existed. Jessup, Territorial
Waters at 9-66 (cited in note 129).
..See Heinzen, 11 Stan L Rev at 605-12 (cited in note 129); Riesenfeld, Protection of
Coastal Fisheries at 188-94 (cited in note 134).
"See Jessup, Territorial Waters at 41-43 (cited in note 129); Riesenfeld, Protection of
Coastal Fisheries at 175-80 (cited in note 134).
"See Jessup, Territorial Waters at 26-31 (cited in note 129); Riesenfeld, Protection of
Coastal Fisheries at 194-203 (cited in note 134).
" See Riesenfeld, Protection of Coastal Fisheries at 280 (cited in note 134).
"Id at 144-46. For other examples, see Heinzen, 11 Stan L Rev at 630 (cited in note
129).
" Thus, for example, Spain ignored some British complaints in the nineteenth century
about Spanish jurisdictional claims and seizures beyond the three-mile limit. See Riesen-
feld, Protection of Coastal Fisheries at 146-47 (cited in note 134). "In 1874 Great Britain
tried... to bring about an international demarche of the maritime powers in favor of the
three-mile rule and against the Spanish claims; but most of the other powers either did
not want to commit themselves, or disagreed with the British point of view." Id at 147.
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the territorial sea. 47 In addition, the treatise writers were deeply
split." Those who claimed that CIL required a three-mile band
were predominantly English-speaking jurists who reflected their
nations' views of CIL. 4
9
Turning to the details of state practice, throughout the pe-
riod many nations enforced antismuggling and related security
laws outside the three-mile band.5 ' The standard view explains
these examples away as "exceptions" to the three-mile rule or as
actions that other nations did not challenge for reasons of "com-
ity."'5  A better explanation is that the coastal nation has a strong
interest in asserting jurisdiction beyond three miles in this con-
text, and other nations usually have little reason to encourage
smuggling into the coastal nation. This is not to suggest that all
anti-smuggling regimes arose from such a coincidence of interest.
Sometimes the assertion of anti-smuggling jurisdiction beyond
the three-mile limit resulted in protests, although these protests
did not always, or even usually, result in a retreat to the three-
mile line. 52 Even a relatively weak state is in a good position to
patrol coastal waters; so a large state that seeks to preserve the
three-mile line may be too weak to enforce its will when many
weak states violate the rule by claiming a broader territorial sea.
A related problem was the scope of the band of territorial sea
in which a neutral nation's ships could remain immune from bel-
"'For example, widespread disagreement about the scope of the territorial sea precipi-
tated the North Sea Fisheries Convention of 1882. See id at 149-50; Fulton, The Sover-
eignty of the Sea at 630-32 (cited in note 139). Although the parties to the Convention
eventually agreed by treaty to a three-mile rule for fishing, the conference leading to the
Convention was marked by disagreement about territorial sea requirements under CIL.
Similarly, at the 1930 Hague Conference for the Progressive Codification of CIL, twenty
states sought a three-mile territorial sea, four states sought a four-mile territorial sea,
and twelve states sought a six-mile territorial sea, and many states sought rights over
contiguous zones beyond three miles. See Churchill and Lowe, The law of the sea at 102-03
(cited in note 133). Both the first and second United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences-
in 1958 and 1960-tried and failed to agree upon a limit for the territorial sea. See id;
Heinzen, 11 Stan L Rev at 641-51 (cited in note 129). On the inability of various private
groups devoted to codification to agree on a territorial sea limit during this period, see Ri-
esenfeld, Protection of Coastal Fisheries at 99-111 (cited in note 134).
" See Riesenfeld, Protection of Coastal Fisheries at 279-80 (cited in note 134).
"'See Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea at 681 (cited in note 139).
" See Manchester v Massachusetts, 139 US 240, 258 (1891) ("[A]l governments .... for
the prevention of frauds on its revenue, exercise an authority beyond [the three-mile]
limit."). See generally Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea at 594 (cited in note 139) (sur-
veying this practice); Jessup, Territorial Waters at 19, 25, 76-96 (cited in note 129) (same).
"'This is the strategy of Jessup. See Jessup, Territorial Waters at 76-96 (cited in note
129).
"'For example, England complained about the 1853 Spanish seizure of the British
ship Fortuna, but Spain ignored the complaint, and England dropped the matter after
failing to rally support from other nations for its position. See Riesenfeld, Protection of
Coastal Fisheries at 146-47 (cited in note 134).
1999] 1161
HeinOnline  -- 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1161 1999
The University of Chicago Law Review
ligerent capture. During the period in question, some nations as-
serted a three-mile zone of neutrality, but many other nations as-
serted zones of neutrality beyond three miles."3 These regula-
tions were rarely tested because there were relatively few mari-
time wars in the seventy years prior to World War I." But the
few international clashes in this context are revealing. During
World War I Britain successfully checked Norway's assertion of a
four-mile neutrality zone by capturing Norwegian ships three
miles outside of Norway; but, at the same time, England (and the
United States) acquiesced in Italy's assertion of a six-mile neu-
trality zone "out of courtesy."55 Scholars have reconciled these ac-
tions by arguing that the Norwegian situation exemplifies the
true CIL rule and that the Italian deviation was permitted out of
comity. A better explanation is that England had the power to co-
erce compliance with the three-mile rule and a significant inter-
est in intercepting Norwegian shipping destined for Germany.
But it did not enforce the three-mile rule against its ally Italy.
The relationship between England and Norway was one of coer-
cion; the relationship between England and Italy was one of coin-
cidence of interest.
The deviations from the ostensible three-mile rule exemplify
the larger principle that a nation could assert jurisdiction beyond
the three-mile limit in self-defense or for self-preservation."' This
"exception" to the three-mile rule-analogous to the military ne-
cessity exception in the prize cases or the national security excep-
tion to ambassadorial immunity-suggests that the three-mile
rule did not limit national action in cases where nations had in-
terests in exceeding the limit. A similar story explains the prac-
tice of asserting jurisdiction beyond three miles over the rare,
valuable, and exhaustible sedentary fisheries such as coral and
oysters.5 ' The same idea inheres in the single exception to exclu-
sive jurisdiction within the three-mile zone-the CIL right of in-
nocent passage.15 The right of innocent passage permits a foreign
ship to pass through the territorial sea unless the ship does
something to prejudice the security, public policy, or fiscal inter-
ests of the state.'59 There is indeed a long-term behavioral regu-
'"For a few of many examples, see Jessup, Territorial Waters at 25, 47-48, 103-05
(cited in note 129).
'See Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea at 604, 651 (cited in note 139).
"See Jessup, Territorial Waters at 25 n 86, 34 (cited in note 129); Riesenfeld, Protec-
tion of Coastal Fisheries at 163 (cited in note 134).
"See Jessup, Territorial Waters at 96-101 (cited in note 129).
See id at 13-16.
See id at 120.
"See id at 120-23.
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laxity of nations not seizing foreign ships passing close to shore
that are deemed innocent. But nations have varying and self-
serving definitions of innocence; the "rule" does nothing to pre-
vent a nation from seizing a ship that the nation perceives to be a
threat to its interest. What international scholars consider to be
CIL is nothing more than a description of states acting in their
national interest: states seize ships passing through their territo-
rial sea exactly when they have reason to do so."o All of these ex-
amples are inconsistent with the traditional account of the three-
mile rule; all have straightforward explanations within our
framework.
Another embarrassment to the traditional account that
makes sense within our theory concerns the double standards of
the three-mile rule's proponents. During the same period when
Great Britain championed and enforced the three-mile rule, it
acted to preserve its ability to assert jurisdiction beyond three
miles when it suited its needs.16" ' For example, during the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries, the English Hovering Acts as-
serted customs jurisdiction beyond the three-mile range."' And in
legislation and treaty-making during the late nineteenth century,
England was careful not to commit itself to the three-mile rule
generally, and to preserve its rights to assert jurisdiction beyond
the three-mile limit with respect to certain fishing rights, bays,
folded coasts, pearls, and coral banks.6 ' Similarly, the United
" Compare William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law 216 (Clarendon 7th
ed 1917) (i.T]he state is ... indifferent to... what happens among a knot of foreigners so
passing through her [territorial sea] as not to come in contact with the population. To at-
tempt to exercise jurisdiction in respect of acts producing no effect beyond the vessel, and
not tending to do so, is of advantage to no one.").
"' See Riesenfeld, Protection of Coastal Fisheries at 131, 148-54 (cited in note 134). See
also Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea at 651-52 (cited in note 139) (Great Britain has
"taken pains to make it clear that in adopting a three-mile limit for particular purposes
they do not abrogate their right to the farther extent of sea that may be necessary for
other purposes.").
'England repealed the Hovering Acts in the late nineteenth century but did not fully
eliminate its authority to assert customs and related jurisdiction over foreign ships beyond
three miles. See Riesenfeld, Protection of Coastal Fisheries at 131, 142 (cited in note 134).
'"This point is detailed in id at 148-71. Four prominent examples of this phenomenon
are: (1) England's 1878 Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act provided that criminal jurisdic-
tion would be exercised for three miles to the sea, but also preserved jurisdiction beyond
the three-mile range "as is necessary for the defence and security of such dominions." Id at
148. (2) Over England's objections, the 1881 North Sea Fisheries Convention included a
three-mile rule for fishing rights. England resisted the explicit three-mile rule in order to
maintain flexibility to protect the burgeoning trawling fishing practice of its citizens on
foreign coasts. See id at 152. The English implementing statute made clear that the three-
mile zone only extended to matters explicitly included within the treaty, and that England
maintained jurisdiction beyond the three-mile zone in a variety of contexts. See id at 149-
52. (3) The Scotch Herring Fishery Act of 1889, which prohibited certain forms of trawling
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States protested Russian restrictions on sealing beyond three
miles in the Bering Sea when Russia owned the sea. But after the
cession of Alaska to the United States in 1867, the United States,
pursuant to an act of Congress asserting U.S. dominion over the
entire Bering Sea, seized seal hunters in the Sea beyond the
three-mile limit."' This is one of many examples of the United
States "var[ying] her principles and claims as to the extent of ter-
ritorial waters, according to her policy at the time."'65 These phe-
nomena show that, as in the other case studies, nations will as-
sert changing and inconsistent readings of CIL consistent with
their interests.
Throughout the period, the greatest clashes over territorial
jurisdiction concerned the area of water to which a nation's citi-
zens would have exclusive fishing rights. Coastal nations with
weak navies sought to maximize the breadth of exclusive fishing
rights; nations with powerful navies sought to minimize the scope
of exclusivity. There was little stability in actual practice.
As one would expect from their proximity and shared body of
narrow water, England and France (and to a lesser degree Eng-
land and Belgium, and England and Holland) frequently clashed
over the three-mile rule for fishing.'66 To the extent that the
three-mile rule was effectively embraced, it was done so by virtue
of carefully negotiated bilateral and multilateral treaties rather
than customary practice, yet even these treaties were frequently
violated. Both sides captured ships of the other that were fishing
beyond the three-mile limit, and both sides had ships that fished
within the other's three-mile limit. To be sure, the history was
not one of unremitting chaos. There were short periods in which
two nations engaged in what might be called cooperative behav-
ior, almost invariably pursuant to a treaty. One explanation for
such cooperation is that two states with access to a fishery find
themselves in a bilateral repeat prisoner's dilemma, and when
conditions are favorable, cooperation will occur. Consistent with
beyond the three-mile limit in Moray Firth (a "firth" is a Scotch term for a long, narrow
sea inlet), and under which numerous Norwegian boats fishing beyond three miles (in-
cluding British fishermen registered under the Norwegian flag) were prosecuted. See id at
158-60. The British government eventually returned the fines and released the ships'
masters, but only after Norway agreed to prevent Norwegian trawlers from entering
Firth, and not because of a rule of CIL. Id at 158-60; Meyer, Jurisdiction in Coastal Wa-
ters at 142-43 (cited in note 139). But see Jessup, Territorial Waters at 430-36 (cited in
note 129) (claiming that the three-mile CIL rule was vindicated in Moray Firth contro-
versy). (4) England consistently asserted jurisdiction beyond three miles for purposes of
sedentary fishing, such as pearls and coral. See Jessup, Territorial Waters at 13-17.
See Jessup, Territorial Waters at 54-57 (cited in note 129).
' Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea at 650 (cited in note 139).
" This paragraph draws heavily on the account in id at 605-50.
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this theory, the most successful instances of cooperation-such as
the harvesting of oysters-occurred when both sides would
clearly be harmed by over-exploitation, and violations were rela-
tively easy to identify.
Similarly, Spain and Russia tried to assert fishing rights be-
yond the three-mile zone. Sometimes, they succeeded. More often,
they were met with threats of force from England and the United
States, and backed away to defend only a three-mile band. This is
thought by some to evidence a rule of CIL. A better explanation is
that England and the United States had much stronger navies
and powerful interests in maximizing areas in which their na-
tionals could fish. It is not surprising that nations with powerful
navies would tend to desire the narrowest possible territorial sea,
and would usually get their way.
The only puzzle is why the United States and England rec-
ognized even a three-mile territorial sea. The answer is likely
that neither the United States nor England was powerful enough
both to provide safe passage to their civilian fishing vessels along
the coast of a hostile power and to defend their fishing vessels
close to home. Most states have a stronger interest in protecting
their own coastal seas than in maintaining rights for their ships
in distant seas for the simple reason that their fishing industry
can more cheaply harvest the coastal seas, which are close to
shore, than distant seas. In addition, it is considerably easier to
defend coastal seas, both by ship and from the shore, than to
maintain power over a distant sea.
Thus, every state of roughly similar power has a strong in-
terest in agreeing not to interfere with the coastal fisheries of
other states in return for a commitment not to interfere with
their own coastal fisheries. The only problem-which is charac-
teristic of such games-is coordinating on a particular area. What
is needed is a focal point. Any band defined by a constant dis-
tance from the coastline is more simple, more "focal," than the al-
ternatives, such as particular longitudes and latitudes. So it is no
surprise that the fights about defining the territorial sea for
fishing purposes was couched in terms of band widths. That the
three-mile rule was frequently invoked during the period in ques-
tion can be explained by the fact that three miles comported with
the eighteenth century cannon-shot mark-the rough distance
from which a nation could protect its seas from shore. 6 ' But, of
'"Compare id at 694 CIt must not be forgotten that the three-mile limit was selected
... because it had been already recognized and put into force in connection with the rights
of neutrals and belligerents in time of war, as representing the approximate range of guns
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course, states would have different interests over the size of the
band, as the optimal size for each state would vary according to
local technologies, economic needs, and types of fish available;
here we would expect the powerful states to prevail over the weak
states.
16
Finally, the fishing example illustrates how various exoge-
nous shocks led to changes in behavior. A prominent example was
trawling, a late nineteenth century development. 6 ' Trawling was
a profitable but destructive form of fishing; trawling just outside
the three-mile band disrupted fishing within the band much more
than prior fishing methods. The rise of the steamship (also late
nineteenth century) made trawling possible at much farther dis-
tances. These developments heightened conflicts over fishing
zones and precipitated the expansion of asserted and defended
fishing zones early in the twentieth century.'70 It also explains
why England began to hedge on its formal assertion of the three-
mile rule in the late nineteenth century. England wanted to as-
sert trawling broadly abroad but protect fisheries at home. This
led it to refrain from asserting a well-defined rule, relying instead
on standards that it-the preeminent naval power-could inter-
pret flexibly to suit its needs.
at the time.").
'This game can be viewed as a Battle of the Sexes: every state had an interest in a
free coastal area, but different states preferred larger or smaller coastal areas. To take a
simple example, suppose that state X specializes in a certain kind of fishery x, which ex-
tends from its shore to two miles from state Ys shore. State Y specializes in fishery y,
which extends from its shore to three miles from Xs shore. Each state would also like to
fish from the fishery in which it does not specialize. In the absence of coordination, both
states would fish from both fisheries, leading to exhaustion. If they could coordinate by
agreeing to specialize in one fishery, exhaustion would be avoided, but such coordination
would be difficult to monitor. A territorial sea rule would be easier to monitor, but each
state has an interest in a different rule. X prefers a two-mile rule, because this would al-
low it to exploit its entire fishery; and Y prefers a three-mile rule, because this would al-
low it to exploit its entire fishery plus some of fishery x. Either rule could be an equilib-
rium, but as relative power changes, the loser under the existing rule is likely to challenge
it and seek by treaty a change to the rule that it favors. See text accompanying notes 185-
186.
" On this point see Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea at 698-703 (cited in note 139);
Riesenfeld, Protection of Coastal Fisheries at 152-55 (cited in note 134).
'"As Brown notes of the state of affairs before trawling.
Given the technology of the period, there was little significant conflict between the in-
terests of coastal communities in the fish stocks adjacent to the coast and those of
foreign, distant-water fishing States, and, in any event, even if there had been an
awareness of such conflict, the number of independent coastal States so affected
would have been so small and their power and lack of co-ordination such that no seri-
ous challenge to freedom of fishing could possibly have been mounted.
E.D. Brown, 1 The International Law of the Sea 8 (Dartmouth 1994).
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Another example of how exogenous shocks can change be-
havior: as more nations gained independence, the behavioral
regularities became less common. '71 Cooperation and coordination
become exponentially more difficult as the number of participants
increases. Although a rule may evolve that governs fishing among
a few large states, it is unlikely that a rule could evolve to foster
cooperation or coordination among dozens of states.172
The CIL of the territorial sea was never uniform and never
static. Nations followed different behavioral patterns in different
maritime contexts, in accordance with their interests and power.
Behaviors changed during relatively short periods of time. The
ostensible three-mile rule did little, if any, work in affecting the
actual behavior of nations. Sometimes one nation had an interest
in asserting jurisdiction beyond the three-mile limit, and no other
nation had an interest in preventing this act. This was coinci-
dence of interest. Other times a nation tried to assert jurisdiction
but was met by a threat of retaliation from a more powerful na-
tion. This was coercion. In yet other contexts, nations engaged in
mutually beneficial cooperative behavior by refraining from exer-
cising jurisdiction beyond a three-mile limit. This can be seen as
a prisoner's dilemma or a coordination game. The many puzzles,
inconsistencies, or "violations" that appear under the traditional
view make sense when viewed through the lens of the various
and changing interests at stake.
Rather than following an exogenous rule, then, states acted
in their self-interest, and their behavior changed as their inter-
ests changed. In arguing for a rule of CIL, jurists commit the fal-
lacies of (a) inducing a rule of CIL from a few cases that amount
to a behavioral regularity in a specific context during a short pe-
riod of time; (b) labeling behavioral patterns inconsistent with the
ostensible rule as "exceptions" or "comity"; (c) viewing a coinci-
dence of interest or coercion situation as evidence of cooperation;
and (d) analyzing behavioral patterns without considering the
different underlying logics that these patterns exemplify.
IV. EXTENSIONS
In this Section, we extend the theory beyond CIL to consider
its implications for related issues. We consider domestic constitu-
tional arrangements for identifying and enforcing CIL, and the
relevance of our analysis for treaties and international human
rights law.
.' See id.
"See text accompanying note 42.
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A. National Interests and the Domestic Enforcement of CIL
Our theory of CIL explains multinational behavioral regu-
larities as a function of national self-interest. This assumption is
a simplification. A nation's self-interest is a complex amalgam of
the interests of citizens and institutions."' We have skirted this
problem by relying on the assessment of the national interest
identified by a nation's political leadership. Every form of gov-
ernment overcomes the many difficulties in determining the na-
tional interest in foreign affairs by delegating the task to national
political figures. We do not claim that national political leaders
accurately identify the national interest, only that they do so de-
finitively. 74
National political leaders determine a nation's views about
the content of CIL and order national actions that either contrib-
ute to or defy the behavioral regularities that are said to consti-
tute CIL. Sometimes, however, national commitments related to
CIL will require domestic enforcement by courts. For example,
when the political branches incorporate their views about CIL
into a. treaty, statute, or executive agreement, courts enforce
these enactments. Courts will apply a domestic statute or treaty
even in the face of the claim that the enactment violates CIL. In
the courts' view, the political branches' official statements about
the content of CIL trump all other sources of CIL."5
It is often the case, however, that courts apply CIL without
any guidance from the political branches. The political branches
may specify in a treaty or statute that CIL controls a particular
issue, but not specify the content of the CIL rule. Or courts may
apply CIL directly, as "part of our law," even in the absence of
any incorporation by the political branches. 6 In these contexts,
"For discussions, see Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam, eds,
Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (California
1993); Robert 0. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in
Robert 0. Keohane, ed, Neorealism and its Critics 182-83 (Columbia 1986); Putnam, 42
Intl Org at 427 (cited in note 46); and James N. Rosenau, National Interest, in David L.
Sills, ed, 11 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 34 (MacMillan 1968).
.
4
.As liberal internationalists are quick to point out, international relations broadly
conceived are carried out by numerous governmental and nongovernmental actors oper-
ating at a variety of levels and contexts. See, for example, Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood,
92 Am J Intl L at 382-83 (cited in note 2). We have no quibble with this point, which does
not have much relevance to CIL considered alone. The identification and application of
CIL is performed primarily by governmental actors in accordance with a strict hierarchy
of authority. In this Section we are trying to explain how that hierarchy is consistent with,
and informed by, our theory.
" See Restatement (Third) § 112, comment c. See also Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist
View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L Rev 665, 684-707 (1986).
"'Today, courts tend to apply CIL as domestic law in the absence of apparent legisla-
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courts must determine the content of CIL and enforce it. Two
positive claims about this practice follow from our theory.
The first is that courts would obey informal instructions by
their political leaders about the content of CIL. This is in fact the
practice, at least in the United States.'77 The Supreme Court's de-
cision in The Paquete Habana is a rare counterexample that
proves the rule. 78 There the Admiral of the Navy, with the ap-
parent approval of the Secretary of the Navy, justified the seizure
of a fishing smack on the grounds that the smack had a "semi-
military character" and contained excellent sailors who might as-
sist the Spanish cause.'79 In its brief to the Court, the executive
branch argued, among other things, that the seizure had a mili-
tary justification.' In rejecting this argument, the Court may
have been influenced by the fact that the President had pro-
claimed that the United States would conduct the war consis-
tently with "the law of nations" and "the present views of na-
tions."'' Nonetheless, The Paquete Habana is an exception to the
usual pattern, an exception that is rarely if ever repeated.82
Second, in the absence of executive guidance, our theory sug-
gests that the court is in effect deputized to apply CIL in accor-
dance with the national interest. The court looks to all the para-
phernalia of the jurisprudence of CIL-the treatises and the his-
tory books, the UN resolutions and the pronouncements of execu-
tives, the formal understandings, and the unratified treaties. But
this chore can serve two different purposes. When the court is
confident that it can determine which course of action is in the
national interest, it will use CIL to rationalize the result. Biased
national court interpretation of international law is a well-known
phenomenon.' When a court is uncertain about what is in the
tive authorization only in human rights cases involving foreign officials. See Curtis A.
Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights
Litigation, 66 Fordham L Rev 319, 328 (1997).
'"See Trimble, 33 UCLA L Rev at 684-707 (cited in note 175); Restatement (Third) at
§ 112, comment c. In the rare cases that a court does not, the political branches retain the
power to overrule the courts determination of CIL for future cases. See Restatement
(Third) at § 326, comments a-d.
- 175 US 677 (1900).
'See Jordan J. Paust, Paquete and the President. Rediscovering the Brief for the
United States, 34 Va J Intl L 981, 982 n 6 (1994).
" Brief for the United States No 395, The Paquete Habana 17, 23, 32-33 (Oct Term
1899).
The Paquete Habana, 175 US at 712.
luSee Trimble, 33 UCLA L Rev at 724-25 (cited in note 175) (citing many examples).
"For modern examples, see Sale v Haitian Centers Council, Inc, 509 US 155, 170-88
(1993); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v Schlunk, 486 US 694, 698-708 (1988); Soci&t6
Nationale Industrielle Agrospatiale v US District Court for the Southern District of Iowa,
482 US 522, 541-46 (1987).
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national interest, it can read the indicia of CIL to try to make a
more objective determination of dominant pertinent behavioral
regularities. It does so not because CIL is binding in any real
sense, but rather because the regularities reveal information
about what other states have done in like circumstances and thus
serve as evidence about what the host state's interest may be in
the case at hand."'4
B. Treaties
As we explained above, CIL may describe international be-
havior in a bilateral repeat prisoner's dilemma, but this is possi-
ble only under special conditions. Among other things, it is neces-
sary that states be able to recognize when an action is cooperative
and when an action is not. Sometimes, the status quo will supply
a focal point. For example, at time 0, states do not seize the fish-
ing vessels of other states because their navies have more valu-
able opportunities; at time 1, these opportunities disappear and a
prisoner's dilemma comes into existence. If each state persists in
the status quo, and does not seize a fishing vessel, then as long as
all of the conditions for cooperation in a repeat game are met, a
CIL norm against seizing fishing vessels can develop. By con-
trast, if states seize each other's fishing vessels at time 0, there is
no natural way to coordinate a cessation. If one state refrains
from seizing the vessels of the other, as a way of suggesting to the
other state that joint restraint would be a superior alternative,
the other state might misinterpret this action as a change in the
first state's payoffs rather than as an offer to cooperate. If so, the
other state will continue to seize the vessels of the first state.
An obvious solution to this problem is communication. If the
first state announces that it will discontinue seizure of fishing
vessels, but only as long as the other state does the same, the
second state will not misinterpret the first state's actions. It
might not believe the first state's commitment, but it will under-
stand it. If it does understand the commitment, it may desist as
well and cooperation will result.
In most circumstances, however, optimal cooperation is com-
plex. State i might be willing to stop seizing the fishing vessels of
state j, but only as long as it is certain that the crews of the ves-
sels are not spying on state i's military operations or transporting
'"A similar rationale may explain the Charming Betsy canon of construction, which
requires courts to interpret statutes to be consistent with international law when possible.
On this canon, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Pow-
ers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 Georgetown L J 479 (1998).
1170 [66:1113
HeinOnline  -- 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1170 1999
Theory of Customary International Law
weapons. Thus, state i might insist that "cooperation" in this
game means allowing each state to stop and search fishing ves-
sels and to detain them if they present a threat. In the absence of
communication, state j might interpret such unilateral action by
state i as a violation of the focal understanding not to seize fish-
ing vessels. Communication allows states to engage in optimal
cooperation, rather than engaging in moderately valuable actions
that are dependent on focal points that already exist. Communi-
cation allows states to create new focal points.
We hypothesize that this is a primary function of many trea-
ties. A treaty can record the actions that will count as cooperative
moves in an ongoing repeat prisoner's dilemma or the actions
that achieve the highest joint payoff in a coordination game. On
this view, the treaty itself does not have independent binding
force. States refrain from violating treaties (when they do) be-
cause they fear retaliation from the treaty partner(s), or because
they fear a failure of coordination, not because they feel an obli-
gation. In repeat prisoner's dilemmas, when the treaty sets out
clearly what counts as a cooperative action, it becomes more diffi-
cult for a state to engage in opportunism and then deny that the
action violated the requirements of a cooperative game."' In co-
ordination games, when the treaty sets out what the coordinating
action is, it becomes less likely that a failure of coordination will
occur because of error. Treaties might also facilitate cooperation
or coordination-even, potentially, in multinational contexts-by
establishing organizations that generate information, facilitate
communication and negotiation, structure interactions, and pro-
vide the institutional mechanisms needed to enforce selective in-
centives for national action.18 Anticipating these potential bene-
fits, states rationally send representatives to meet and negotiate
treaties.
We do not mean to suggest that all, or even most, treaties fa-
cilitate cooperation or coordination. Some treaties might simply
reflect the underlying interests of powerful nations (and thus be
examples of coercion)," 7 and other treaties might require "only
"U Lipson makes a related claim, arguing that states enter into treaties in order to evi-
dence the seriousness of their claims. He maintains that treaties are more public than in-
formal agreements, so violation of a treaty injures a state's reputation more than violation
of other agreements. See Charles Lipson, Why are some international agreements infor-
mal?, 45 Intl Org 495, 502-08 (1991).
MSee Kenneth W. Abbot and Duncan Snidal, Why States Act through Formal Interhia-
tional Organizations, 42 J Conflict Resol 3, 4-5 (1998); William J. Aceves, Institutionalist
Theory and International Legal Scholarship, 12 Am U J Intl L & Pol 227, 240-56 (1997).
" See John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 Intl Se-
curity 5 (1995); Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the limits of cooperation" a realist critique
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modest departures from what [nations] would have done in the
absence of an agreement"" (and thus be examples of coincidence
of interest).
We lack space to pursue these ideas further here. We men-
tion them only to show how our theory of CIL would cohere with a
theory of treaties, the essential point being that treaties, like
CIL, can emerge endogenously from the rational behavior of
states. CIL is the label attached to behavioral regularities that
emerge in various strategic settings; treaties may be labels at-
tached to certain pronouncements that emerge in various strate-
gic settings. These pronouncements, like behavioral regularities,
occur because states believe the pronouncements serve their in-
terests.189 The main difference between the two forms of law is
that CIL evolves in the absence of clear and authoritative com-
munication between interested states, which makes it difficult to
achieve cooperation or coordination, whereas treaties are a prod-
uct of authoritative communication and thus are more likely than
CIL to produce cooperation or coordination.
C. International Human Rights Law
Thus far we have examined traditional rules of CIL that
regulate inter-national relations. Following the Holocaust, the in-
ternational community expanded the focus of international law to
include governance of the way a nation treats its citizens. Since
World War II, nations have signed scores of multilateral human
rights treaties that purport to regulate the way they treat their
citizens with regard to such issues as genocide, torture, and vari-
ous civil rights.190 These treaties are, in effect, promises by one
nation to other nations that it will protect the human rights of its
citizens. And these treaties, in turn, are said to give rise to a
flourishing CIL of human rights.191
of the newest liberal institutionalism, 42 Intl Org 485, 497-98 (1988).
" George W. Downs, et al, Is the good news about compliance good news about coopera-
tion?, 50 Intl Org 379, 380 (1996).
"'Setear uses the idea of the repeat prisoner's dilemma to explain treaties. See John
K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations The-
ory and International Law, 37 Harv Intl L J 139 (1996). Setear's main point is that trea-
ties contain mechanisms that enhance the incentive to cooperate in repeat prisoners' di-
lemmas.
"For an overview, see Richard Pierre Claude and Burns H. Weston, eds, Human
Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action (Pennsylvania 1989); Richard B. Lillich
and Hurst Hannum, International Human Rights: Problems of Law, Policy and Practice
(Little, Brown 3d ed 1995).
"' See Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 Fordham L Rev at 328 (cited in note 176).
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This CIL of human rights differs in many respects from tra-
ditional CIL.192 The central relevant difference for our purposes is
that, in contrast with received wisdom about traditional CIL, the
new CIL of human rights makes no pretense of reflecting a uni-
versal behavioral regularity. The CIL of human rights thus raises
two questions that call for explanation. First, why is there such a
gap between what the law requires and the actual behavior of na-
tions? (This question is often phrased in terms of international
human rights law's poor enforcement record.) Second, what ac-
counts for the fact that some CIL prohibitions-for example, the
prohibition on genocide--do appear to track a general behavioral
regularity?
We begin with the exceptional case, the CIL prohibition on
genocide. Some nations in history have committed genocide, but
most nations most of the time do not.193 Some might view this be-
havioral regularity, in combination with many pronouncements
(such as the Genocide Convention 94), as evidence that nations re-
spect the prohibition on genocide as a legal obligation. This ac-
count is consistent with the behavioral pattern but cannot ex-
plain violations of the norm or offer reasons why nations appear
to comply with it. A better explanation is that the absence of
genocide reflects a coincidence of interest. Both before and after
the development of the ostensible international law prohibition in
this century, nations rarely committed genocide. Most nations
lack any reason to commit genocide, and even nations with a rea-
son to do so find it very costly in military, economic, or moral
terms.
Now consider cases in which nations do have a reason to
abuse their citizens. 95 Governments often find it useful to torture
certain individuals, or to deny to citizens certain civil rights such
as freedom of speech. Nations that commit human rights abuses
highlight the gap between the law and the actual behavior of na-
tions. This gap between law and practice makes sense under our
theory.
We certainly would not expect to see cooperation on this is-
sue. Consider a world of two nations: A, which abuses its citizens,
"'For an overview, see Bradley and Goldsmith, 110 Harv L Rev at 838-42 (cited in
note 9).
"'For a historical survey, see Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Soci-
ology of Genocide. Analyses and Case Studies (Yale 1990).
" See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, [1948]
78 UNTS 277, TIAS No 1021 (1951).
"'We are not suggesting here that human rights abuses are ever morally justifiable.
We are simply describing the cases when nations believe that they have reason--on moral,
political, economic, or any other ground-to commit human rights abuses.
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and B, which does not. A gains nothing but loses something if
both nations agree to stop abusing citizens. The same is true for
B if both A and B abuse their citizens. They lose something and
gain nothing from a mutual agreement to provide greater protec-
tion to their citizens. Cooperation is obviously no more likely
among multiple nations. Assuming for the moment an absence of
coercion (i.e., selective incentives such as forgone economic aid,
threat of military intervention, or diplomatic ostracization), a na-
tion that violates its citizens' human rights will have no incentive
to comply with more restrictive international human rights
norms.
This all suggests that we would expect nations not otherwise
inclined to protect human rights to abide by international human
rights law only if other powerful nations enforce compliance. 9 '
Consider the international slave trade. By the end of the nine-
teenth century, the slave trade had all but died out. The behav-
ioral regularity of not trading slaves is best explained by the fact
that Britain and, to a lesser degree, the United States developed
national interests in abolishing the international slave trade, and
enforced their will with the threat of military force.' We need
not take a position in the debate whether religious, economic, or
other reasons accounted for the British and American govern-
ments' decision to ban international slavery.9 ' Whatever the rea-
son for the change of national interest, a new behavioral regular-
ity of not trading slaves arose because the United States and
Britain punished or threatened to punish militarily those states
which violated this interest. 199
A similar coercion story explains the patterns of enforcement,
and limited efficacy, of modern international human rights law.
Consider the position of the United States, the world's leading en-
forcer of human rights. The United States sometimes has rea-
son--grounded in domestic political factors and geopolitical con-
cerns-to reduce a foreign nation's mistreatment of its citizens.
But it is very costly for the United States to enforce international
human rights, and it tends to do so in the two situations that pre-
sent special enforcement incentives. The first occurs when one
nation's human rights violations pose a significant adverse threat
to the United States. This explains, for example, the United
'See Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights, in Volker
Rittberger, ed, Regime Theory and International Relations 139, 140-41 (Clarendon 1993).
" See id at 152-55.
"For a comprehensive examination of this issue, see Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade.-
The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade 1440-1870 449-785 (Simon & Schuster 1997).
' See Krasner, Sovereignty, Regimes and Human Rights at 154-55 (cited in note 196).
HeinOnline  -- 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1174 1999
Theory of Customary International Law
States intervention in Haiti (to avoid a domestic crisis in Florida).
A second context where we find human rights enforcement is
when the federal government receives domestic political benefits
from enforcement, and the costs of such enforcement-in eco-
nomic or military terms-are low. Examples of this phenomenon
are U.S. economic sanctions against weak and unpopular coun-
tries like Cuba and Myanmar. In general, the United States will
not enforce human rights if enforcement is costly and the strate-
gic benefits of enforcement are low or uncertain. This explains
the absence of human rights law enforcement against China (a
powerful military and economic foe) and Saudi Arabia (an impor-
tant ally).2°°
This enforcement pattern-against weak foes but not against
strong foes or friends-is consistent with the claim that the effi-
cacy of human rights law tracks the enforcement interests of
powerful nations. So too is the fact that the core international
human rights, and the ones most widely embraced, mirror the
rights protected by the United States Constitution. 0 ' Also consis-
tent with the coercion story is the fact that at the same time the
United States is enforcing human rights law abroad, it is
thumbing its nose at international human rights law at home. 2
Although United States domestic law provides abundant protec-
tions for human rights, many practices in the United States-the
juvenile death penalty, prison and police standards, and certain
immigration acts-might fall below the requirements of interna-
tional human rights law.203 But the United States resists applica-
tion of this law to itself. It has been slow to assent to human
rights treaties, and when it does assent it attaches reservations
and declarations that render the assent meaningless. 24 And
while United States domestic law permits domestic enforcement
=' NATO's recent war with Yugoslavia is consistent with the enforcement pattern de-
scribed in this paragraph. The bombing of Yugoslavia was motivated in part by the hu-
man rights abuses there. But it is no accident that the Western powers responded to hu-
man rights abuses in Southern Europe and not (for example) in Rwanda or Turkey or
Chechnya. The enforcement in Yugoslavia was justified in order to prevent destabiliza-
tion of the Balkans; and Western leaders thought this strategic aim could be accomplished
in relatively inexpensive fashion.
" See Louis Henkin and Albert J. Rosenthal, eds, Constitutionalism and Rights. The
Influence of the United States Constitution Abroad (Columbia 1990).
'For descriptions of this practice, and different views about its legitimacy, see Jack L.
Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law and the United States Double Standard, 1
Green Bag 2d 365 (1998); Amnesty International USA, United States of America: Rights
For All (1998).
'See Amnesty International USA, Rights For All (cited in note 202).
2"Id; Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 Am J Intl L 341 (1995).
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of the CIL of human rights law against foreign diplomats, it does
not permit enforcement of this law against domestic officials.0 5
This behavior is easy to understand, for there is no nation able to
enforce a more restrictive human rights regime against the
United States.
We do not mean to suggest that high-profile military or eco-
nomic sanctions by powerful governments are the only ways to
enforce human rights law. Along many points of diplomatic and
economic interaction, more subtle low-level sanctions can be
brought to bear on nations that abuse their citizens. These sanc-
tions are facilitated by international organizations devoted to ex-
posing human rights abuses and organizing interest groups to
encourage powerful nations to enforce human rights. These
strategies make a difference, for some nations otherwise inclined
to violate international standards do take steps to avoid exposure
of illegal acts and engage in sporadic acts of compliance (such as
releasing a dissident prisoner or announcing new human rights
aspirations). But the difference is usually small, and is in any
event fully explained by sanctions that can be brought to bear on
recalcitrant nations rather than compliance with CIL.
CONCLUSION
CIL scholars are too optimistic about empirical reality and
too pessimistic about theory. In this Article we have borrowed
from two traditions in the international relations literature in an
attempt to rectify both problems. The first tradition is realism.
Realism emphasizes that states act rationally to further their
perceived national interest, and that the distribution of national
power determines international behaviors. Realism is skeptical
about international cooperation and international law. By con-
trast, the second tradition-institutionalism-is more optimistic
about international cooperation and international law. It argues
that states acting rationally to further their own interests can
sometimes overcome conflicts of interest to achieve mutually
beneficial cooperative outcomes. But institutionalists put their
faith in international organizations constituted by treaty that re-
duce transaction costs and information problems. They ignore
CIL which, by definition, arises from decentralized and noninsti-
tutionalized state acts.
We have applied the insights of both realism and institution-
alism to explain CIL. Both the theory and the case studies sug-
See Goldsmith, 1 Green Bag 2d at 366-69 (cited in note 202).
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gest that when states achieve joint gains, the most plausible ex-
planation can be found in the bilateral coordination and pris-
oner's dilemma models. Theory and the case studies also suggest
that most instances of supposed cooperation are best explained as
coincidence of interest or successful coercion. In short, CIL has
real content, but it is much less robust than traditional scholars
think, and it operates in a different fashion.
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